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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the 
potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown.  The political dimension and 
implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the 
provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored.  This research 
presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the ‘new relationship’ policy in 
British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the 
Crown and First Nations.   The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the 
Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this 
province.  Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and 
their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex 
relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 When the current Saskatchewan government was elected in 2007, it announced the 
dawn of a new relationship with First Nations based on “mutual respect and trust” that would 
allow everyone to “move forward together.”  A key driver in this process was the need for the 
Province to address the question of the duty to consult.1  As an embodiment of this new 
relationship, the Premier invited Chiefs from across the province to the first traditional feast ever 
held on the grounds of the legislature.2  Later that same year, the Premier attended a Chiefs’ 
Legislative Assembly and pledged his intention to hold a “historic” roundtable with Aboriginal 
people, industry and government to discuss consultation on lands and resources within the next 
180 days.3  Such consultation held the promise of truly bringing the parties together in a practical 
way.  However, rather than serving as a vehicle for furthering this new relationship, the 
negotiations illustrate the difficulty in translating the rhetoric of mutuality and cooperation into a 
workable process with designated roles and responsibilities.  What began as a pragmatic process 
for tackling the duty to consult has quickly become a question of what exactly the concept of the 
new relationship entails.  At present, the provincial government and the Federation of 
Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) appear to be at a block in the road.   
 Several other provincial and territorial governments across Canada have committed 
themselves to improved Aboriginal relations under the banner of building a ‘new relationship.’  
Although the relationship between territorial governments and Aboriginal peoples probably has 
undergone the most significant restructuring, e.g. Yukon, some important differences exist with 
respect to the territories that limit their application to Saskatchewan.  The case of First Nations in 
British Columbia offers the most insightful example of how the concept of a new relationship 
can actually take root in policy.  Since the concept of a new relationship between First Nations 
and BC is still at an emergent stage, it is difficult to evaluate its long-term outcomes, but some 
                                                
1 Please note that the phrase ‘duty to consult’ as used in this thesis denotes the duty to consult and accommodate, 
except in Chapter 3, where the two legal concepts are discussed separately. 
2 Saskatchewan. First Nations and Métis Relations “First Ever Chiefs’ Feast at the Legislature Marks a New 
Relationship,” News Release, December 18, 2007, http://www.gov.sk.ca/news?newsId=47281237-3862-44bf-8f01-
9b87e3d1f2f6 (accessed October 5, 2008). 
3 Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, Lands and Resources Secretariat. Portfolio Report: Lands and 
Resources Secretariat, November 25, 2008, 
http://www.fsin.com/landsandresources/downloads/Lands%20Resources%20Commission%20Portfolio%20Report
%20Nov%202008.pdf,  (accessed March 9, 2009), 7. 
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preliminary observations can be made.  The most striking observation so far is that the principles 
guiding the new relationship are based on real power sharing, within the scope of what some 
might call the expansion of treaty federalism.  With its long history of exploring the ‘Indian land 
question,’ British Columbia4 offers Saskatchewan a glimpse of how its own relationship with 
First Nations may unfold, with regard to lands and resources. Such a comparative analysis holds 
much promise in moving the relationship in Saskatchewan from the level of vision to a workable 
process. 
 This thesis investigates how treaty federalism is being advanced through ‘new 
relationship’ policy in British Columbia and duty to consult jurisprudence, and the resulting 
implications for Saskatchewan.  Two questions are driving this research:  
 
1.  How have the competing rights and jurisdiction of First Nations and the Crown on  
     lands and resources been reconciled through consultation in British Columbia?   
2.  What type of consultation framework will work for Saskatchewan?   
 
A Policy Priority   
 The design and implementation of a consultation policy on lands and resources is 
currently a priority in Saskatchewan for a number of reasons.  First, heightened opportunities for 
resource development, particularly in the provincial north, have increased the potential benefits 
and pitfalls for the parties.  The northern part of Saskatchewan is a vast expanse of land, rich in 
resources, totalling almost half of the province’s entire land mass.  The vast majority of the 
province’s future energy resources—uranium, oil sands, and hydro—as well as other mineral 
resources, forest and non-timber resources, and northern tourism lie in Northern Saskatchewan.  
Although development has occurred in the north already, it promises to rise significantly in the 
near future as evidenced by the increasing number of industry players vying for provincial 
exploratory and development permits and licenses in the area.5  The direct and indirect economic 
benefits to be reaped from the land are immense.  However, the impact of impending 
                                                
4 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849–1989. 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990). 
5 Saskatchewan. Ministry of Energy and Resources. “Boyd Takes Saskatchewan’s Mining Success Story to 
Vancouver, News Release, January 28, 2008 - http://www.gov.sk.ca/news?newsId=f36747ac-80e7-47ee-954d-
e146ea96ef05 (accessed February 24, 2008); Saskatchewan.  Ministry of Energy and Resources. “October Land Sale 
Generats $32.4 million,” News Release, October 8, 2009 - http://www.gov.sk.ca/news?newsId=91daccff-b3dc-
4e93-8e11-61868420fb73. (accessed October 31, 2009). 
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development on existing Aboriginal and treaty rights promises to be extensive.   Although 
constituting mostly ‘unoccupied’ Crown land under provincial jurisdiction, the north has been 
occupied and used by Aboriginal people for centuries.  Their attachment to the land and the right 
to use it for subsistence (hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering purposes) and ceremonial 
purposes is recognized in historical treaties and affirmed in case law. Further recognition and 
affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights has yet to be negotiated. Meeting industry’s timelines 
and adequately consulting with First Nations is the current challenge of realizing Saskatchewan’s 
looming resource development opportunities. 
 The demographic characteristics of the First Nations population in Saskatchewan is 
another important factor driving the pre-consultation process. The First Nation population is 
rapidly growing, has solid and longstanding political organization, and is determined to improve 
its poor socio-economic conditions through the duty to consult.  From 2001 to 2010, the 
Aboriginal population in Saskatchewan increased by almost nine per cent, while the provincial 
population shrunk by almost 3 per cent during the same period.6  As of 2009, First Nation people 
comprised nearly 13 per cent of the total Saskatchewan population.7 If you travel to Northern 
Saskatchewan, the concentration of Aboriginal people jumps to almost 86 per cent.8 Projections 
suggest that the population of Saskatchewan will be 40 per cent Aboriginal by 2025.9  Although 
linguistically diverse10 and comprised of 74 Bands, each with its own elected Chief and 
Council—virtually all of these Bands belong to one of ten regional Tribal Councils and a single 
provincial body, the FSIN.11   
Saskatchewan First Nations have an important legacy of political activism related to 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  The roots of First Nation political activism may be traced back to 
the point of first contact, and arose in order to protect the political sovereignty and basic self-
                                                
6 Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics. http://www.stats.gov.sk.ca/. 
7 This percentage is based on data from the Government of Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics. 
http://www.stats.gov.sk.ca/ as of January 2009 (Total Saskatchewan population of 1,023,810 as of January 1, 2009, 
and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada First Nations in Saskatchewan data - http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ai/scr/sk/fni/pubs/fnl-eng.asp. as of February 28, 2009.  
8 Saskatchewan.  Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of Advanced Education, Employment and Labour, Northern 
Region Office.  Northern Saskatchewan Regional Training Needs Assessment Report 2008-2009, April 2008. 
9 Gary Tompkins, “Aboriginal Socioeconomic Status and Development”, Department of Economics, University of 
Regina, January 2008. Paper Presented at the conference Saskatchewan Economic Boom - Challenges and 
Opportunities. 
10 The First Nations are comprised of five distinct groups: Cree, Dakota, Dene (Chipewyan), Nakota (Assniboine) 
and Saulteaux. Source: Canada. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ai/scr/sk/fni/pubs/fnl-eng.asp. 
11 Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. www.fsin.com (accessed June 2009).   
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determination of First Nations.12  As Beatty points out, the “First Nations in Saskatchewan have 
a legacy of strong political governance systems in their own respective communities, which have 
evolved over the years into equally complex institutions of local, regional, provincial, national 
and international organizations.”13  The political effectiveness of First Nations in Saskatchewan 
is further evidenced by their proven ability to establish and operate institutions such as the 
Saskatchewan Indian Federated College, Saskatchewan Indian Cultural Centre, Saskatchewan 
Indian Institute of Technology, Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority and First Nations Bank 
of Canada.14  In addition, among the First Nations, all but four are signatory to one of the six 
historical numbered treaties covering the entire land mass of the province.15   This shared history 
is the foundation of First Nations’ unity, bringing them together for the common purpose of 
honouring the treaties, according to their shared understanding.16   
 Despite their strong political organization and unwavering commitment to upholding the 
treaties, the socio-economic conditions of First Nations in Saskatchewan still lag behind those of 
non-Aboriginal residents.  On the whole, the average First Nation person experiences poorer 
health, possesses less formal education, tends to lack adequate housing and is more likely to be 
unemployed or incarcerated than the typical Saskatchewan resident.17  With such pressing issues 
on their agenda, First Nations desire greater control to forge a better future for themselves and 
the necessary resources to support their self-governance.  As has been illustrated, time and time 
again, greater First Nation self-determination leads to improved economic and social.18   
                                                
12 Bonita Beatty, “Saskatchewan First Nations Politics: Organization, Institutions and Governance”, In 
Saskatchewan Politics: Crowding the Centre, ed. Howard A. Leeson, Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 
University of Regina, 2008, 202. 
13 Ibid., 202. 
14 Office of the Treaty Commissioner, Statement of Treaty Issues:  Treaties as a Bridge to the Future, 
October, 1998.  http://www.otc.ca/pdfs/OTC_STI.pdf (accessed April 2009),79.  
15 Treaties 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 cover the Province of Saskatchewan. INAC, http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ai/scr/sk/fni/pubs/fnl-eng.asp. 
16 Beatty, 202. 
17 Canada. Statistics Canada. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada in 2006: Inuit, Métis and First Nations, 2006 Census. 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?catno=97-558-XIE2006001&lang=eng (accessed May 2009). 
18 Stephen Cornell, Catherine Curtis, and Miriam Jorgensen. (2003) The Concept of Governance and Its 
Implications for First Nations, A Report to the British Columbia Regional Vice-Chief, Assembly of First Nations. 
Vancouver: Native Nations Institute for Leadership, Management, and Policy. 
http://www.fngovernance.org/pdf/BCAFN_Governance.pdf); Stephen Cornell, (2006) What Makes First Nations 
Enterprises Successful? Lessons from the Harvard Project. Native Nations Institute for Leadership, Management, 
and Policy, Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development; Paul Barnsley, “Strong Native 
government way to viable businesses,” Windspeaker,  May 10, 1993;  Jacquelyn Thayer Scott, “Doing Business 
with the Devil: Land, Sovereignty and Corporate Partnerships in Membertou Inc.,” Halifax: Atlantic Institute for 
Market Studies, July 2004 - http://www.aims.ca/library/membertou.pdf (accessed Oct 1, 2008).  
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The duty to consult is viewed as a key vehicle in garnering a greater share of the control 
of, and benefits from, lands and resources in the province.  Buckley Belanger, an MLA from 
northern Saskatchewan, describes consultation from the First Nation point of view as “their last 
stand, so to speak, when it comes to land, resource development, opportunity, and power.”19  
Overall, the status quo of First Nations in the province is becoming increasingly unacceptable, or 
has been for some time, and politically active First Nations are determined to bring about 
change, particularly where consultation on lands and resources is concerned.  
 The design of a new consultation policy also has been sparked by the election of a new 
provincial government committed to forging a new relationship and consultation policy with 
Aboriginal people.  The Saskatchewan Party was elected on December 11, 2007.  One of its 
election platform pillars was ‘Strengthening the Partnership with First Nations,’ which included 
commitments to “[w]ork with First Nations and Métis peoples to develop a protocol that will 
protect their rights and interests, ensuring the provincial government fulfills its duty to consult 
and accommodate” and to “[c]onsult with First Nations and Métis peoples in the development 
and implementation of all provincial legislation and policy that impacts or has the potential to 
impact their jurisdiction.”20  In addition, two months before the last election, party leader Brad 
Wall attended a FSIN Legislative Assembly, and pledged to host a consultation roundtable on 
lands and resources with Aboriginal leaders and industry representatives within 180 days of 
taking office.21  In May 2008, the new Premier made good on his promise and held a ‘historic’ 
two-day roundtable with Aboriginal leaders and industry representatives to discuss the creation 
of a new consultation process on lands and resources.22   
 Adding to the necessity of formulating new policy is the fact that no definitive provincial 
consultation policy is in place in Saskatchewan.  Previous policy guidelines developed under the 
leadership of the former NDP government in 200623 were rejected by First Nations, because they 
did not have input into their design; the content described only “the minimum legal requirements 
of government departments to consult” and “their implementation created conflict and 
                                                
19 Saskatchewan.  Standing Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs and Justice, Hansard Verbatim Report No. 7 – 
April 28, 2008, Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 26th Legislature, 128. 
20 Saskatchewan Party. “Securing the Future: New Ideas for Saskatchewan,” September 24, 2007. 
http://www.saskparty.com/assets/pdf/New%20Ideas/SecuringTheFuturePlatform.pdf, 25 
21 FSIN, Portfolio Report, 6. 
22 This roundtable was held 173 calendar days after the swearing in ceremony of Premier Brad Wall. 
23 Saskatchewan. First Nation and Metis Relations. Government of Saskatchewan Guidelines for Consultation with 
First Nations and Métis People: A Guide for Decision Makers, May 2006.  
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controversy.”24  Indeed, stated explicitly in the preface of the guidelines is the acknowledgement 
that the guidelines outline only the legal minimum of consultation.  However,  each department 
was encouraged to tailor consultation to its “unique needs,” which could be more “expansive” 
than the minimum requirements; and in addition, the consultation approach set out did not have 
to “replace” or “supercede” existing internal policy and practices.25  Such a preface suggests that 
the guidelines are little more than an unfinished green paper, offering no real policy direction.  It 
is little wonder that problems ensued concerning the implementation of the guidelines, as stated 
by the FSIN.  These guidelines became ‘interim’ policy in January 2008 and continue to guide 
consultation in the province.  The former NDP government also established a First Nations and 
Métis Consultation Participation Fund worth $2 million in March 2007 that was renewed by the 
Saskatchewan Party government and increased to $3 million in the 2008-09 fiscal year.  
 Following the roundtable discussion, a report of the proceedings was released on October 
6, 200826 and a draft consultation framework was issued on December 22, 200827 for review by 
First Nations and industry stakeholders. In addition to the roundtable conference, additional 
meetings were held with smaller groups of First Nations in the province, primarily regional tribal 
councils, in order to produce the draft framework.28 The provincial government anticipated that a 
final policy would be in place by early 2009. 29  Although some progress was made in producing 
a draft consultation policy, the process has stalled.  In February 2009, the draft framework was 
rejected unanimously by First Nations at a special FSIN Legislative Assembly, which called for  
more time and meetings to discuss the duty to consult.30  The “extended deadline” of June 1, 
2009 for a final policy also has since passed,31 and to date, no final consultation policy is in 
place. 32 
                                                
24 FSIN, Portfolio Report, 5. 
25 Guidelines, 2006, no page number. 
26 Saskatchewan. First Nations and Metis Relations. Seeking Common Ground:  Roundtable Conference Report, 
October 6, 2008, http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca/Consultation-Roundtable/ (accessed January 10, 2009). 
27 Saskatchewan. First Nation and Metis Relations. Draft Government of Saskatchewan First Nation and Métis 
Consultation Policy Framework, December 2008 http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca/Consultation-Framework/ (accessed 
January 24, 2009). 
28 Draft Framework, 2008, 3. 
29 Saskatchewan. Ministry of First Nations and Metis Relations. 2008-09 Annual Plan. 
30 Luke Simcoe.  "FSIN rejects proposal." Leader Post, February 20, 2009, http://www.proquest.com.cyber.usask.ca/ 
(accessed May 20, 2009).  
31 Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan Hansard, 2521-2522, March 24, 2009. 
32 As of December 1, 2010. 
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A Way Forward 
 This thesis argues that addressing the question of the duty to consult cannot be 
accomplished as a technical policy problem in and of itself.  Rather, the duty to consult needs to 
be addressed within a broader framework of building a new relationship through the principles of 
treaty federalism.  This type of political investigation represents a break from the largely 
legalistic analysis of the duty to consult and to accommodate that dominates the literature on the 
topic.   
 A corollary of this argument is that the ‘new relationship’ that falls within the treaty 
federalism approach may be utilized to structure First Nation-state relations, whether the First 
Nation has signed a historical treaty, a modern treaty or has yet to sign a treaty.  Although the 
impetus for greater control of lands and resources may differ, ranging from the existence of 
Aboriginal title to the supposed ceding of Aboriginal title through modern or historical treaties, 
the First Nation-state relationships analyzed here are approaching the same type of power-
sharing arrangement vis-a-vis lands and natural resources.  In the case of British Columbia, many 
First Nations have yet to sign a treaty (a notable exception, of course, is the modern-day Nisga’a 
Treaty), while Saskatchewan is representative of a jurisdiction where much of the land is subject 
to historical treaties.   
 The development of land and natural resource policy, based on a framework that benefits 
all parties is important to the economic, social and political future of Canada. Generally, this 
research is significant because it will further the understanding of the complex relationship 
between government and First Nations regarding lands and natural resources.  In particular, this 
research highlights the important linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal 
governance, and their implications for ‘duty to consult’ and ‘duty to accommodate’ policy.  In 
addition, since key sectors of the resource industry are being rapidly developed in Saskatchewan, 
a workable and beneficial Aboriginal consultation policy will be a definite advantage in this 
province.  Saskatchewan has an opportunity to avoid the lengthy litigation, failed negotiations 
and civil disobedience characterizing the process of land and resource development in many 
jurisdictions across Canada.  Also, First Nations in Saskatchewan have an opportunity to 
participate in decision-making on lands and natural resources that will better serve their 
economic and social development. Finally, to date, no such comparison of BC and Saskatchewan 
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policy as it relates to the political dimension and implication of the duty to consult has been 
researched, nor has much attention been paid to the Saskatchewan Party’s articulation of a new 
relationship with First Nations.   
 A marked limitation of this research is that although the duty to consult and to 
accommodate pertains to all Aboriginal peoples, which includes Métis, non-status Indians, Inuit 
and First Nations, this paper deals only with the obligation to First Nations.  This decision should 
not be construed as implying that the duty owed to other Aboriginal peoples is not as equally 
worthy of consideration or research.  In fact, other Aboriginal peoples may stand to gain much 
more from inclusion in policy-making concerning lands and resources than First Nations, owing 
to their unique social, political and economic history and circumstances.  
 This thesis consists of six chapters.  Chapter one has provided the background, purpose 
and focus of the thesis.  Chapter two provides a discussion of the context and concept of treaty 
federalism.  Chapter three focuses on how the legal principles of the duty to consult may act as a 
mechanism for restructuring Aboriginal-state relations according to a treaty federalist 
relationship.  Within this conceptual framework, Chapter four examines how treaty federalism is 
being articulated and implemented through the development of a new Aboriginal-state 
relationship in British Columbia.  Chapter five identifies policy principles, based on treaty 
federalism, on which a new relationship framework in Saskatchewan could be built and within 
which the question of the duty to consult could be successfully addressed.  Chapter six provides 
conclusions based on the preceding analysis and offers options for future research.  
 The methodology employed in this research is a qualitative policy analysis of land and 
resource policy in BC and Saskatchewan, as it relates to Aboriginal and treaty rights.  Any given 
policy analysis may be concerned with determinants of policy, policy content and the impacts of 
policy.33  In order to gain a solid understanding of the direction of the new relationships 
concerning lands and resources in the jurisdictions studied here, my analysis is concerned 
primarily with the policy processes, which involved a focus on the structural determinants of 
policy, the policy content and its impacts.  Inherent in process analysis is the presumption that 
“the political process and all of its complex interactions are responsible for the policy profile of a 
state at any given time.”34  There is also an evaluative aspect to my analysis in that the policy 
                                                
33 Leslie A. Pal, Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction (Toronto: Methuen, 1987), 22-23. 
34 Ibid., 30. 
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instruments are measured against the concept of treaty federalism.  The primary documents 
consulted consist of the relevant case law; government regulations, guidelines and reports from 
BC and Saskatchewan; and First Nations reports, resolutions, press releases, guidelines and 
responses to government policy.  Secondary sources of information include analysis by legal 
scholars and practitioners on Aboriginal rights discourse and the principle of the duty to consult 
and accommodate; policy analysis by various think tanks and academics; and magazine and 
newspaper articles.  
 My own personal worldview, assumptions and position undoubtedly have influenced my 
research.  It is a truism that: “[t]he answer to a question can often depend on who is doing the 
asking.”35  As a Cree person, and a member of the Okanese First Nation, which is signatory to 
Treaty 4 in Southern Saskatchewan, I grew up with a keen awareness of the treaties, and their 
impact on the political relationship between First Nations and the Crown.  I believe that this 
awareness enabled me to more readily consider the treaty federalism framework as a viable 
option, than perhaps an individual with a dissimilar background.    
That said, however, I would like to emphasize that I strove to manage my own position, 
by approaching the research from the ‘ground up.’  My research began with analysis of the legal 
jurisprudence on duty to consult, and then proceeded to explore the duty to consult policy of 
other jurisdictions, most notably British Columbia.  Finally, I carefully examined the nascent 
policy and current positions of the political players in Saskatchewan.  It was after investigating 
these three streams, and then during the development of my thesis proposal, which involved 
valuable input from professors in the Department of Political Studies at the University of 
Saskatchewan, that the concept of treaty federalism was introduced to my research.  In short, the 
treaty federalism framework evolved from the research, rather than dictated its flow.  
                                                
35 Zina O’Leary, The Essential Guide to Doing Research, (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2004), 45. 
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Chapter 2: Treaty Federalism 
 
 The concept of a ‘new relationship’ lies at the heart of the consultation process between 
First Nations and the Province of Saskatchewan, because before consultation can proceed, each 
party’s specific decision-making role and responsibilities must be determined.  Put simply, 
agreement must be reached on how to consult, before consultation can begin.  At one end of the 
spectrum is the concept of a relationship based on absolute provincial power with minimal 
consideration of First Nation rights and interests.  At this end of the spectrum, First Nations are 
invited to the feast, but it is the province dictating the menu and who gets served when and how 
much.  At the other end, is a relationship based on complete First Nation jurisdiction and 
authority over lands and resources on their traditional territories (Crown lands) effectively 
overriding the provincial ability to govern.  At this end of the spectrum, the province may have 
sent the invitation, but First Nations have brought their own food and servers, and now the 
province must sit quietly by and eat their share.  At the end of the day, both parties will feast on 
some benefits, but neither scenario is especially attractive nor in keeping with the protocol and 
spirit of a jointly hosted and mutually beneficial feast.   
 
Present Relationship 
 Efforts to redefine and renew the treaty federalism-relationship between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal peoples have been underway for decades.  Treaty federalism is one of many 
models that promises better relations between the two groups, and hence, a more workable 
federation.  In this chapter, the context and concept of treaty federalism will be described, and 
literature analyzing the validity and desirability of the concept will be presented.  
 Aboriginal peoples have long decried the fact that they are often ‘outside looking in’ with 
regard to Canadian federalism.  When jurisdictional powers originally were divided among 
Parliament and the legislatures and enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1867, the consent of 
Aboriginal peoples was neither sought nor given, and for this reason the division of powers lacks 
legitimacy for Aboriginal peoples.36  Rather than being partners in Confederation, Aboriginal 
                                                
36 Martin Papillon, “Canadian Federalism and the Emerging Mosaic of Aboriginal Multilevel Governance.”  In 
Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, edited by Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, 
291-313. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2008, 295. 
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people became “an object of federal jurisdiction according to section 91(24) of the Act.”37   In 
keeping with colonialist attitudes at the time, any status that Aboriginal peoples may have 
possessed as original inhabitants of the land was ignored as the “dominant society simply 
imposed its conception of sovereignty and claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the territory.”38  
The colonial notion of sovereignty or what Ladner calls the “official history”39 allowed for only 
two constitutionally recognized levels of government, and so Aboriginal peoples were afforded 
no political space to participate directly in the formal institutions of “intrastate federalism.”  This 
trend continues today, and includes exclusion from the mechanisms of “interstate federalism” or 
the “growing web of intergovernmental processes and institutions.”40  When a matter involving 
Aboriginal people straddles jurisdictional boundaries, both orders of government are unwilling to 
assert their jurisdiction or take responsibility,41 leaving many Aboriginal issues and people 
abandoned in a jurisdictional limbo.   
 The area of lands and resources is an exception to the rule.  In matters concerning lands 
and resources that involve Aboriginal rights and interests, both the federal and provincial 
governments have weighed in on the issues.  For the most part, the area of lands and resources 
has created “tense relations” between Aboriginal peoples and the provinces, rather than 
cooperation.42  Provincial governments and Aboriginal peoples historically have had few 
occasions to interact with one another through the processes and institutions of Canadian 
federalism, given that matters involving ‘Indians’ fall under federal jurisdiction.  This may soon 
change.  The conflict regarding lands and resources between the Province and First Nations may 
be a harbinger of things to come, as First Nations continue to assert and legally gain influence or 
even authority in other jurisdictions falling under provincial power. 
 Clearly, the status quo of Canadian federalism needs to change if Aboriginal people are 
going to be able to participate fully in its ongoing evolution.  Papillon concludes that “the 
institutions and processes of Canadian federalism have exacerbated conflicts with Aboriginal 
people and have contributed significantly to the reproduction of the system of exclusion inherited 
                                                
37 Ibid., 295. 
38 Ibid., 292. 
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from the colonial period.”43  Henderson describes the situation slightly differently, “There is 
little interconnectedness between Canadian politics and Aboriginal politics.  The existing 
connection can be viewed as domination by the colonialists.  Aboriginal peoples seldom love 
such relationships.”44   
However, avenues for change have been identified. Abele and Prince analyze four 
competing Aboriginal-state federalist relationships in Canada, including the model of Treaty 
Federalism.  The four models are: "mini-municipalities" embedded in federalism-as-usual; new 
subnational entities in a modest adaptation of Canadian federalism (adapted federalism); a fully-
developed third order of government in the federation (trilateral federalism); and Aboriginal 
governments as part of a treaty-based alliance between the Aboriginal governments and the 
Crown in Canada (nation-to-nation or treaty federalism).45  The authors describe Treaty 
Federalism as advocating the greatest degree of change in terms of its constitutional status and 
the relationship envisioned among Aboriginal communities and the Crown.   
The mini-municipality has powers similar to those of Canadian cities, but since the 
Aboriginal form would be smaller than your average city, it would be ‘mini.’46  To date, the 
authors find that no Aboriginal nations are supportive of the ‘mini municipalities’ model.47 The 
second model—adapted federalism—encapsulates the idea of an ‘Aboriginal province’ or at least 
a territory where a new public Aboriginal government is created.  The only example of this 
model is Nunavut.  The authors conclude that this model doesn’t have a future, because the 
conditions that led to its creation, such as the demographics of Nunavut, with its population 
being 85 per cent Inuit, make it unique.  Even other Inuit groups contemplating self-government 
models do not have this large of a population.  
The third model, trilateral federalism, advocates a third order of government for 
Aboriginal peoples that is part of the constitutional structure on par with the provincial and 
federal governments. It is built upon the recognition of an inherent right to self-government for 
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Aboriginal peoples.48   It involves a new division of powers, whereby the federal and provincial 
governments would share jurisdictional authority and power with Aboriginal peoples.49  The 
specific areas of jurisdiction would be negotiated by all levels of government, with Aboriginal 
peoples having sole jurisdiction in some respects; sharing jurisdiction and the delivery of goods 
and services in others; and in areas of national interest, the federal government would maintain 
its jurisdiction and authority.50   It would also involve a fair share of natural resources, based on 
Aboriginal rights, such as title.  The instruments for achieving such a model of governance 
include “treaty negotiations, interim measures, administrative arrangements, and policy 
innovations” which would entail the transferring of certain jurisdictions and authorities to 
Aboriginal governments and institutions.51  As a result, other “cooperative measures between 
governments with respect to jurisdictions, laws, and service” would also be required to make this 
model workable.52   The authors believe that this model of government would ensure “financial 
stability” and increased decision-making powers for Aboriginal governments.53   Its 
implementation would require the creation of special institutions,54 but is supported by the 
historical status of Aboriginal nations and their current constitutional position.55  The authors 
argue that this model has been gaining dominance in Canada since the 1970s, because it is 
consistently supported in case law through the recognition of Aboriginal governance as an 
inherent right;56  and through public policy developed by the federal government and various 
public bodies, such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).  This model is 
commonly regarded as “offering a new and better relationship between Aboriginal peoples and 
the Canadian state.”57 
The fourth and final model described by the authors is the “nation-to-nation” model or 
the concept of ‘treaty federalism.’  The authors describe the concept as the realization of the 
treaty-based relationship with First Nations.  A First Nation does not “join” federalism, instead it 
is a sovereign nation that has relations with the Crown in Canada, and this relationship is defined 
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by a treaty.58  Integral to this model is the belief that the power of Aboriginal self-government 
existed prior to the Canadian state and is derived from outside the Crown, and that Aboriginal 
nations exist “with distinctive traditions and practices of self-determination, including 
governance.”59   This nation-to-nation model is embedded in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.60  
The authors present the argument of Tully on this model. He argues that this ‘“post colonial 
paradigm” is just emerging, overshadowed by what he regards as colonial perspectives still 
embedded in the mini-municipalities model, and to a degree, the vision of a third order in 
Canadian federalism.”61 
 
Destination: Renewed Relationship 
 At its core, Treaty Federalism62 may be regarded as the construction of a mutually-agreed 
upon balance between autonomy/freedom and interdependence /belonging.63  Through a treaty, 
the equal worth and value of each nation is recognized, and each retains its space or separate 
sphere of autonomous jurisdiction to continue to live freely in accord with its own rules, laws, 
traditions, etc., beholden only to the will of its people.64  Since the intent of belonging to the 
union is to live peacefully together on the same land, this necessitates a degree of 
interdependence among the parties.  In Canada, this is accomplished through the creation of 
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concurrent areas of jurisdiction where the autonomy of both nations is redefined in relation to the 
other, creating an “innovative transnational covenant”65  or unity.66  This area of ‘relational 
autonomy’ delegates certain rights, responsibilities and obligations to both nations.67  The entire 
process must receive the consent of the signatories in order for it to be legitimate.  No single 
nation has absolute autonomy over the other or the land.  The terms of how the land and its 
bounty are to be shared have been agreed upon, and may only be renewed or renegotiated 
through the same process. Mutual recognition and respect of nationhood, mutual consent and 
dialogue, and trust are the guiding principles of the treaty-making process that ultimately results 
in a treaty federalist arrangement.68 
 Treaty federalism holds the promise of balancing the public goods of civic dignity 
(freedom) and civic participation (belonging) by providing a framework for genuine exchange.  
The practice of treaty federalism is the facilitation of “intercultural dialogue”69 or “rational 
thinking, constructive dialogue and true exchange of ideas”70 between diverse peoples. In order 
for intercultural dialogue to work in practice, it must be guided by the same principles that led to 
the initial arrangement. This is why treaty federalism has been called both an idea and a 
relationship.71  Even when disputes arise regarding the interpretation of a treaty, then the process 
of treaty federalism or intercultural dialogue may be utilized to resolve the dispute.72  Although 
anchored to its fundamental principles, intercultural dialogue is a dynamic process that must also 
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respond to the popular will of the people rather than some higher abstract notion of 
sovereignty.73   Put another way,  
 
 ... the purpose of treaty politics is to provide channels of communication that 
establish and preserve unity and consensus on the basis of a common cultural 
heritage, especially when dealing with outsiders.  There is no abstract concept of 
sovereignty.  Sovereignty exists only when the process of consensus building 
works.74  
 
 The concept of treaty federalism and the other competing federalist arrangements 
outlined here have been advanced with some success in Canada, and each continues to have its 
advocates, all of whom are dissatisfied with the status quo. However, the Indian Act style of 
governance remains the dominant guiding structure for First Nation-Crown relations. Abele and 
Prince do not identify the Indian Act band model as a path to self-governance; instead, the 
authors describe it as constituting a ‘minus municipality,’ because an Indian Act Band lacks even 
the basic self-governing authority of a municipality.  Similarly, Ken Coates asserts that the Act 
embodies the “basic assumptions” that “assimilation, civilization and protection” are necessary, 
and grants authority to the federal government to pursue these ends.75    
 To date, the theory of treaty federalism has yet to be implemented in Canada.  That is, 
unless one accepts the argument that the third order of government and treaty federalism are 
essentially one and the same.   The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), which 
articulated a vision of treaty federalism, has been criticized as advocating Aboriginal governance 
models that, in practice, fail to realize this vision.76  In fact, Abele and Prince argue that the 
nation to nation model and the third order of government model are very similar in their 
“mechanisms of coordination, policy discussion” and mode of decision-making.”77  The only real 
difference is in each model’s formal, dejure power arrangements.78  The authors believe the 
RCAP actually advocates a nation to nation model in theory, but a third order of government 
model in practice.  
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The Royal Commission, through its final report of five major volumes, fudged the 
choice between the third-order and nation-to-nation models.  Besides the elaborate 
commitment to a nation-to-nation approach and to the principles of recognition, respect, 
and reconciliation, when the RCAP got down to cases, it talked about mechanisms for 
integration and a third order. Discussions among Commission staff reconciled the 
matter, at least for some, by saying that at the level of principle, Commissioners were 
arguing for nation-to-nation; while at the level of practicality, they talked in terms of 
government-to-government. We are not sure that this actually works, yet we readily 
concede it is still early days in the post—Royal Commission period of interpretation and 
implementation.79  
 
If one accepts this comparison of trilateral and treaty federalism, then, in practice, Canadian 
federalism has been able to achieve the ideal of Aboriginal governance.  As Coates and Poelzer 
point out, the Nisga’a model of governance in north-western British Columbia actually 
constitutes a “constitutionally protected, third order of government.”80  Despite their similarities, 
a treaty-federalist arrangement remains the most desirable model for Aboriginal-state relations.  
Coates and Poelzer make note of the potential for Canadian federalism to accommodate treaty 
federalism:  “The notion of treaty federalism fits closely with the idea of building a common 
future along the lines of extending our current practice of federalism and of recognizing the 
common institution of the Crown.”81   
 Despite support for treaty federalism or its practical-minded cousin, the third order 
model, both the concept of treaty federalism itself and its historical context in Canada are still the 
object of much debate.  The concept is often perceived as an idealized dream of Aboriginal self-
government, with detractors spurning the notion on both practical and theoretical grounds.  In 
practice, federalism simply cannot be stretched to accommodate a scattered, diverse Aboriginal 
population.  Even if it could, the stretching would lead to disunity and either ‘two solitudes,’ or a 
multiplicity of solitudes, and ultimately, the tearing apart of an interconnected citizenry.  In 
addition, the dominant ideas underpinning the Canadian state—liberal individualism, 
majoritarianism and absolute sovereignty divided between provincial and federal governments—
are incongruent with treaty federalism.  Some analysts also contend that the balance between 
autonomy and interdependence offered through treaty federalism is neither necessary nor 
desirable.  Alan Cairns’ prescription for Aboriginal-state relations stresses interdependence over 
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autonomy, with Aboriginal peoples incorporated into the full body politic of Canada while 
maintaining some rights under the terms of historical treaties, or what he refers to as ‘Citizens 
Plus.’  Taiaiake Alfred would rather err on the side of greater freedom for Aboriginal nations.82  
Tom Flanagan advocates the full integration of Aboriginal peoples, arguing, (ironically), that 
their differentiated or separate status in Canada has undermined their very existence.83 
The history of treaty-making also remains highly contested among and between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legislators, adjudicators and academics.  Problems with 
interpretation and implementation of the treaties have ensued since the years immediately 
following treaty-signing.84  The current problems may be attributed to the fact that when 
indigenous and European nations were originally signing the treaties, both held different 
perceptions of the intent of treaty-making.  According to Abele and Prince, even at the time of 
treaty-making, despite apparent assurances to the contrary, European signatories to the treaties 
“always” had “the clear intention of asserting dominance and control, blended with the 
recognition that particular Aboriginal nations presented an obstacle to this goal.”85  Treaties were 
the “prelude to subjugation” for Europeans.86  Non-Aboriginal signatories conceived of the 
treaties as formal Aboriginal surrender of lands and jurisdiction “in exchange for exclusive rights 
to particular lands and guarantees of matters important to indigenous peoples.”87 Although the 
Indigenous view of the treaties has already been presented— it is the concept of treaty 
federalism88 —it is important to note that indigenous nations do not believe they ever consented 
to the blanket sale of the land.89  As Henderson notes, “The First Nations’ relationships with the 
land have always defined their identity, their spiritual ecology and their reality.  The sale of the 
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land, the sale of the rights of future generations, is beyond the linguistic comprehension of most 
Aboriginal languages.”90 Depending on who is reading the treaties, proprietary title to the land 
and all other political and social rights associated with it were ceded and surrendered by First 
Nations; 0r, only certain treaty rights and obligations were delegated to the Crown by First 
Nations for mutual sharing and stewardship of the land.   
Consentino categorizes the evolving interpretation of the treaties in political science 
literature according to four themes.  The themes are ‘treaties as political accords’; ‘contractualist 
vision’; ‘new interpretative framework’; and ‘treaties as constitutional accords.’91  Proponents of 
the treaties as political accords view them as unenforceable political agreements with indigenous 
peoples, not nations.  Those who view the treaties as ‘ordinary contracts’ are mostly concerned 
with getting the Crown to fulfill its obligations under the contract, but do not advocate a 
restructuring of Crown sovereignty to reflect treaty federalism.  The third theme recognizes and 
supports the principles of the treaties based on a post-imperial political ethic that includes 
principles of “fairness, distributive justice, recognition and meaningful and effective Aboriginal 
participation rather than legalistic and formalistic interpretations of treaties and federal-
provincial division of powers.”92   The fourth and final theme flows from the third, but extends it 
further, viewing treaties as constitutional accords that require accommodation in the form of 
treaty federalism in order for a post-colonial Canadian state to prevail.  The new interpretative 
framework is driving the reinterpretation of treaties and Canadian constitutionalism and paving 
the way for treaty federalism.  But those operating within the new interpretative framework are 
hesitant to challenge the values, beliefs and ideas that underlay the Canadian federation.93 
Consentino supports the view of treaties as constitutional accords because it represents a catalyst 
for overcoming the biases of their earlier interpretation and their institutionalization, but she 
admits that adopting this view is no easy task as it requires nothing less than “transcending 
traditional understandings of federalism and Aboriginal-Crown relations.”94  All four themes 
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currently are evident in the literature, and a similar understanding of the treaties operates among 
legal scholars.95   
The reinterpretation of the treaties and their acceptance as constitutional accords 
according to treaty federalism is far from becoming the prevailing view in Canadian law, politics 
or society.  Treaties as mere political accords or contracts have dominated the views and 
institutions of Canadian constitutionalism.  For the most part, Aboriginal peoples have been 
powerless to formally contest this interpretative control by the Canadian state through the 
mechanisms of federalism.96    
However, in just the last two decades, the mounting ‘reinterpretation’ of the treaties by 
academics from multiple disciplines, including members of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
suggests that the prevailing interpretation of the treaties rests on a narrow reading of the treaties, 
and that a fuller reading, which captures the true nature or ‘spirit and intent’ of the treaties, will 
lead inevitably to their status as constitutional instruments.  Although an examination of the 
entire body of case law on the treaties is not within the scope of this paper, some key principles 
calling for a different sort of interpretation of treaties have been articulated by the Supreme 
Court.  When interpreting the text of a treaty, the Courts have stipulated that “a generous and 
liberal” interpretation must be used, and “extrinsic evidence”, such as oral history, must be 
considered in addition to the written text itself.97  To do otherwise might compromise the 
“integrity and honour” of the Crown because it would entail a failure to fulfil promises that 
caused a First Nation to sign a treaty.98   
According to academics, Ray, Miller and Tough, past works offered biased, uncritical 
accounts of the government as “all-wise and generous” and “operating with foresight, honour 
and generosity.”99 Such an account of any government today would be laughed off its pages as 
blatant propaganda.  At the same time, the indigenous nations were portrayed as “passive” 
signatories to treaty “contracts” that extinguished their original property rights.100  The authors 
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contend that early accounts of treaty-making were based on the few sources of written evidence 
supporting this view—mostly the papers of treaty commissioners.   
Using a more critical, comprehensive methodology, the authors contend that the treaties, 
as agreed upon by both sides, were supposed to ensure the continued livelihood of First Nations, 
in both traditional (hunting, fishing, trapping) and contemporary forms (agriculture),101 and that 
indigenous nations would be allowed to maintain their self-rule.  Interdependent relations with 
newcomers were represented thusly: 
 
[Treaty Commissioner] Morris expounded a negotiation strategy he had developed in 
Treaty 4, which involved stressing that treaties provided “gifts” from a beneficial 
queen mother that took away “nothing” from Indian nations “ways of living,” but 
rather added to them.102 
 
Taking into account the oral history of First Nations, the treaties represented not only binding 
agreements, but solemn and sacred documents that bound the signatories together under the law 
of the Creator or natural law. By their participation in sacred ceremony, such as smoking the 
peace pipe, the non-Aboriginal signatories demonstrated their acquiescence to this principle, and 
seemed to further show their understanding in other ways. 
 
In view of the Elders, the treaty nations – First Nations and the Crown – solemnly promised 
the Creator that they would conduct their relationship with each other in accordance with the 
laws, values and principles given to them by the Creator.  Treaty 6 Elder Norman Sunchild 
stated “When [Treaty 6 First Nations] finally agreed to the treaty, the Commissioner took the 
promises in his hand and raised them to the skies, placing the treaties in the hands of the 
Great Spirit. 
 
 [...] 
  
The duties and obligations that arise from the laws, ceremonies, and traditions that form a 
way of life for the First Nations are clear.  The Elders, for example, explained that when 
promises, agreements, or vows are formally made to the Creator (wiyohtawimawi) through 
ceremonies conducted in accordance with the laws governing them – the promises, 
agreements, or vows so made are irrevocable and inviolable.103 
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Whether the non-indigenous negotiators were simply paying lip service or going through the 
motions to induce Aboriginal nations to sign is debateable, but also irrelevant under any law.  
The agreed upon understanding at the time must prevail.104   
 In sum, the arguments for treaty federalism or treaties as constitutional accords flow 
along three streams, depending on whether one looks to the past, present or future.  Taking a 
look back, treaty federalism is arguably the only model consistent with the foundations of 
Canada’s constitution and creation, and so any further delay in its implementation perpetuates an 
unjust and illegitimate system of governance. Under this argument, the treaties are regarded as 
constitutional documents that provided for the creation and development of Canada. Proponents 
then describe the ways in which treaties were subsequently “ignored, disregarded and trivialized 
by governments and courts.”105  As a result, Aboriginal peoples were not allowed to ‘belong’ to 
the federation, and at the same time, their ‘freedom’ to engage in their own traditional political 
systems was outlawed by government policy.  The implementation of treaty federalism 
represents the bringing to light once again of a “hidden constitution” overshadowed by the dark 
days of colonialism.106  Thus, the new relationship offered through treaty federalism is not new 
at all, but a renewal of a relationship conceived of generations ago.   
 Looking to the present, treaty federalism is regarded as the only model with the potential 
to address the current vestiges of colonialism embedded in Canadian federalism.  Instituting 
minimal Aboriginal self-determination or self-administration is not enough. A more equal 
relationship between First Nations and the Crown, consistent with their political and legal treaty 
history is necessary. The current lack of efficacious autonomous Aboriginal participation within 
the Canadian Federation is cited as evidence of the colonialist bias in favour of Crown power and 
Aboriginal disempowerment.107  
The final argument looks to the future, and is not overly concerned with Canada’s 
constitutional history, only in so far as it constitutes an exemplar of a moral, philosophical 
alternative to the current federal accommodation of cultural diversity.  One thread of this 
argument highlights the fact that federations around the world, including the Canadian 
provincial-federal arrangement are now turning towards a decentralized, interdependent state 
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with autonomous, self-governing units, and a conception of sovereignty that is invested in the 
people rather than in a single, indivisible and absolute authority.108  As part of this argument, 
proponents assert that the present problems with most federations are the result of an ideological 
wrong turn towards nation-building through homogenization rather than through the negotiated 
accommodation of heterogeneity.109  Hueglin points out that treaty federalism is not alien to 
European political thought; instead the idea was not pursued in practice as adherence to absolute 
sovereignty was chosen instead of popular sovereignty.  The second thread argues that treaty 
federalism simply offers the best model for ensuring the peaceful autonomy and efficacious 
interdependence of culturally diverse peoples.  In essence, the “refusal to grant recognition and 
autonomy to such groups [like Aboriginal peoples] is often likely to provoke even more 
resentment and hostility from members of national minorities, alienating them further from their 
identity as citizens of the larger state.”110  When both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people 
understand that the survival of their respective rights, resources and livelihoods is assured 
through treaty federalism, then they are more likely to effectively engage with one another in 
building a unified state.111  In response to the practical objections raised against treaty 
federalism, proponents of all these views are apt to point out that treaty federalism requires no 
formal constitutional change, except perhaps the inclusion of an addendum of the treaties to the 
written constitution. Instead, what is required is the political will and open-mindedness necessary 
to challenge conventional understandings of federalism, and its constituent elements—culture, 
the constitution and history.  Granted, this is no easy task, but if the literature on the subject is 
any indication, momentum is building in this direction.   
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Chapter 3:  The New Relationship and Duty to Consult Jurisprudence 
 
The courts have played a central role in expanding Aboriginal peoples’ participation in 
federalism.  Traditionally, when resolving intergovernmental disputes between the federal and 
provincial governments, the courts commonly perform a valuable, albeit “supplemental” 
function.112  Although not definitively resolving disputes between these two levels of government, 
court decisions inevitably confer “some bargaining power in negotiations” to one level of 
government over another when deciding questions of jurisdiction, which usually facilitates some 
sort of compromise.113  In the case of Aboriginal peoples, the courts have played a similar role, 
except that the willingness of government to ‘bargain’ with or consider the interests and rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, at least in the area of lands and resources, began largely with their legal 
obligation to do so.114  The constitutional protection of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights in 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, has played a major role in this process.  The degree to 
which this entrenchment restrains the exercise of unilateral Crown power with regard to Aboriginal 
and treaty rights is still under debate.  One could argue that the constitutional protection of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights has created a de facto division of powers between Parliament, 
legislatures and Aboriginal nations.115  Or, that it merely created some “political space” for 
Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian federation, and a relatively small space.116  At any rate, s. 35 
has been a primary driver in negotiations between First Nations and the Crown as they work to 
reconcile the rights and interests of Aboriginal and settler societies.117   
The duty to consult is significant within Aboriginal legal discourse because it offers a 
framework for structuring the relationship between First Nations and the state within the political 
space afforded through the constitutional protection of s.35 rights.  According to Sparrow, 
consultation represents one of the means by which government is legally bound to justify its 
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infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights.  While the notion of sovereignty is supposedly not at 
issue with the duty to consult, the legal necessity of consultation to justify Crown policy affecting 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights effectively accords a share of sovereign power to First Nations.  The 
question of consultation then becomes: how much power rightfully must be shared with First 
Nations?  Arguably, this question underlies most Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, but is indeed the 
primary preoccupation of duty to consult case law. Its principles speak directly to the question of  
how far the entrenched sovereignty of the provincial Crown over lands and resources (Section 92, 
Constitution Act, 1867) can intrude upon constitutionally protected Aboriginal and treaty rights 
(Section 35, Constitution Act, 1982) and vice versa.  The concept of treaty federalism obviously 
purports to answer the question of power-sharing between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
governments, but does the duty to consult jurisprudence advocate a similar relationship?  I will 
argue in this chapter that, potentially, the principles do support a treaty federalist relationship 
between First Nations and the Crown.   
An extensive overview of the history and evolution of the jurisprudence on the duty to 
consult would fill several pages.  For the purposes of my research, this chapter focuses only on 
how the principles of the duty support a more equitable relationship between the Crown and First 
Nations on par with treaty federalism.  First, the case law mandates consultation in virtually all 
instances involving a potential Aboriginal or treaty right, and sets out consultation as a 
requirement beginning with the pre-consultation stage.  The consequence of this insistence is that 
a much larger share of decision-making power on lands and resources is afforded to First Nations 
than existed prior to the articulation of the duty or even prior to the emergence of recent cases 
such as Haida Nation118, Taku River119 and Mikisew120.  Second, the case law emphasizes 
negotiation and rights protection, effectively dismissing unilateral Crown or Aboriginal action.  
This insistence adds much-needed political legitimacy to the process of consultation, and ensures 
the concerns of First Nations are substantially addressed and incorporated in a proposed action.  
Third, the courts have called for a two-way, equal exchange of information between the parties.  
Overall, the continuous exchange of information and research, and the joint consideration of 
mitigation measures in favour of Aboriginal rights must be entrenched in the process.  In short, it 
would seem the courts are calling for a type of ongoing intercultural dialogue between 
                                                
118 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation]. 
119 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) 2004 SCC 74 [Taku River]. 
120 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 [Mikisew]. 
26 
 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown that necessitates a treaty federalism framework for 
consultation. For a summary of the comparison of the concepts, please refer to Appendix A. 
The obligation to consult is widely recognized as being hybrid in nature, containing both 
procedural and substantive elements.121  The procedural aspects are rooted in administrative law 
and are concerned with fair procedure, while the substantive elements, which are derived from 
various sources, are concerned with the content of the duty and the right outcome.  This distinction 
has been used to explain the confusion regarding the evolution of the case law as courts often have 
varied in their emphasis on procedure and substance.122   
 The emphasis, or lack thereof, given to the substance of the consultative process has a 
direct bearing on the relationship between Aboriginal people and the Crown.  According to 
Devlin and Murphy, a procedural approach conceives of the duty as a “defence” that amounts to 
a view of the obligation as a mere safeguard against state action that does little to impose 
positive duties on the state.123  The Sparrow test124 is used as a case in point here, because it can 
and has been interpreted as a way for the Crown to demonstrate that its actions were in minimal 
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conformity with its fiduciary duty.125  Additionally, subsequent case law has rendered the Crown 
requirement of a compelling and substantial objective virtually non-existent, because the 
parameters are so broad “as to encompass practically every sort of objective the Crown might 
ever have in mind.”126   
 Potes analyzes the procedural approach in terms of how it views the accompanying duty 
to accommodate.  In her view, accommodation, which is supposed to be the substantive aspect of 
consultation, is perceived as nothing more than an obligation to “listen attentively.”127  All 
decision-making authority remains vested with the Crown, albeit with an obligation to ‘balance’ 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests.128  However, with the aforementioned broad range of 
valid legislative objectives open to the Crown, the ‘balance’ is shifted considerably in the 
Crown’s favour.129  Essentially, under the procedural approach typified in Sparrow, some 
priority is afforded to Aboriginal interests, but the emphasis remains on minimal infringement 
rather than consulting with Aboriginal people.130   Hence, consultation is actually more a 
‘defence’ utilized by the Crown and industry to justifiably infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
Overall, Aboriginal people are not afforded increased powers or any real alteration of their 
relationship with the Crown under this approach.131   This minimalist, procedural approach often 
has been used as the guiding legal rationale for government consultation policy in Canada. 
 The polar opposite of a procedural approach to consultation does not exist, since focusing 
on the substance of consultation can involve a number of different approaches.  What the 
alternatives do share in common though is, first and foremost, a universal rejection of the 
                                                
125 Devlin and Murphy, 270-271, point out that the duty to consult is activated quite late in the test—only at stage 
3b—lending credence to the nature of the duty as a mere safeguard.    
126Gordon Christie, “Developing case law: the future of consultation and accommodation,” University of British 
Columbia Law Review 39.1 (March 2006): 151, cites Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 66 
BCLR (3d) 285, 153 D.L.R. (4th) [Delgamuukw] para 165 as evidence: 
 
 “In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, 
the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the 
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of 
foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with 
[reconciliation] and, in principle, can justify the infringement of [A]boriginal title.”  
 
127 Potes, 33. 
128 Ibid., 34. 
129 Ibid., 41. 
130 Heather L. Treacy, Campbell Tara L., and Dickson, Jamie D.  The Current State of the Law in Canada on Crown 
Obligations to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal Interests in Resource Development, Alberta Law Review, 44, 
(2006-2007): 583. 
131 Ibid., 271. 
28 
 
“emaciated” conception of consultation as a mere procedural right.132  Unlike the procedural 
approach, which bases the duty primarily on the principle of fair procedure according to 
administrative law, a more substantive approach recognizes that the duty originates from the 
assertion of an Aboriginal right, and so the legal sources of Aboriginal rights also form the basis 
of the rationale for consultation.133  The first legal rumblings suggesting that an actual Aboriginal 
right to land may exist, arose in Guerin. The Court decided that First Nations did indeed possess 
some sui generis (unique/special) land ‘interests’ and that the surrender of such lands gave rise to 
a fiduciary duty on the Crown to deal with the lands for the benefit of the First Nation.134  In 
addition, the finding in Calder that Aboriginal title pre-dates and exists independently of the 
Crown gave legal credence to and precipitated the negotiation of outstanding Aboriginal land 
claims across Canada.135  Later, in Sparrow, Aboriginal interests in land were considered for the 
first time in light of their constitutional protection under s.35.  The justification test outlined in 
Sparrow was not meant to be exhaustive, it was supposed to ensure that Crown infringement of 
Aboriginal rights was consistent with its fiduciary duty, and bore in mind that “the honour of the 
Crown is at stake in dealings with Aboriginal peoples.”136 As well, the principle that s.35 
“shapes, informs and curtails the free exercise of [Crown] legislative power” and “the purpose of 
reconciliation embodied in s.35” were also identified as applicable to the duty to consult and 
accommodate.  The precise nature and origin of Aboriginal rights and the purpose of Aboriginal 
rights as per s.35 has been succinctly described by the Supreme Court in Van der Peet: 
 
In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by 
s. 35(1), because of one simple fact:  when Europeans arrived in North America, 
aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and 
participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and 
this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all other minority 
groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, and now 
constitutional, status. 
 
More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through 
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own 
practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty 
of the Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined 
in light of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1) must 
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be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with 
the sovereignty of the Crown137 
 
The laws of procedure also apply to the duty.  Although the duty to consult and accommodate 
may be a relatively new concept, its roots run fairly wide and deep, anchored in decades of 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. 
 Whether drawing upon one or all of the sources of the duty to consult and accommodate, 
the process of consultation under a more substantive approach differs significantly from its 
procedural-based interpretation. For instance, in 2000, Lawrence and Macklem argued that the 
proper substantive approach to the duty meant recognizing and affirming Aboriginal and treaty 
rights through joint negotiation, before any infringement occurs.138  In their words: “What lower 
courts have failed to grasp is that the duty to consult in these cases requires the Crown to 
negotiate in good faith and make every reasonable effort to reach an agreement that delineates 
the rights of the parties to the territory in question.”139  They argued that only this type of 
approach would fulfill the ultimate purpose of consultation—reconciliation.140  The Supreme 
Court’s insistence on negotiation points to the fact that “the resolution of competing claims to 
territory and authority are complex, involving  the consideration of political, economic, 
jurisdictional and remedial judgments,” which are best resolved through negotiation, not 
litigation.141  In addition, negotiated rights protection promotes legitimacy and is consistent with 
a nation-to-nation relationship between the Crown and First Nations.142   In effect, the authors 
are arguing that, in order for consultation to truly achieve reconciliation, a government-to-
government relationship between First Nations and the Crown to jointly negotiate the substance 
of Aboriginal rights is necessary.   
 Fast forward almost a decade and a similar argument that the evolving case law is indeed 
moving towards a more substantive approach can be made. However, this argument derives its 
guidance from the unique relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the state, rather than from 
the process or outcome [e.g. reconciliation] of consultation.143  Along this vein, consultation is 
viewed as a solidarity right, which means to “‘give legal form to social relations of reliance and 
                                                
137 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet] at paras 30-31. 
138 Lawrence and Macklem, 254-55 
139 Ibid., 271. 
140 Ibid., 255. 
141 Ibid., 258. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Devlin and Murphy, 279. 
30 
 
trust’ by imposing an obligation on those who are in a position of power to ‘take other people’s 
situations and expectations into account.’”144  In the case of Aboriginal people and the Crown, 
this means recognizing that their special, fiduciary relationship requires “the state to develop 
concrete processes that respond to, incorporate, and accommodate the social, political, and 
economic needs and rights of Aboriginal people.”145  So, in the end, the consultation process 
would involve the consideration of both process and outcome. It is important to note that, similar 
to Lawrence and Macklem, the author’s emphasis on incorporating the interests of Aboriginal 
peoples likely will involve the ‘mechanism’ of negotiation and a focus on rights protection.   
According to Devlin and Murphy, this conception of consultation, gives rise to a “functionalist” 
Aboriginal-state relationship that occupies the middle ground between Aboriginal idealism and 
Crown unilateralism.  
 The duty to consult and accommodate now has emerged from the shadows of Aboriginal 
rights discourse to become the main attraction in three relatively recent Supreme Court decisions, 
Haida Nation, Taku River and Mikisew.  In all of these cases, it is clear that the Court is 
continuing to call for a consultation process based on negotiation that emphasizes rights 
protection.  First, consider the Supreme Court’s answers to the following outstanding 
consultation questions:  Does the duty apply to third parties, namely industry?  Does the duty 
apply where an Aboriginal right has yet to be proven in a courtroom?  In answer to the first 
question, the Court ruled in Haida Nation that the duty can only be properly discharged by the 
Crown, which also includes the provincial Crown.146  However, the Crown may delegate certain 
procedural aspects of consultation to industry, but is ultimately responsible for monitoring the 
process.147  The key element to note in this principle, which was later clarified in Mikisew is that 
the onus is on the Crown, and only the Crown, to demonstrate that it has provided for meaningful 
consultation, while the First Nation need not prove that the Crown failed to consult adequately.  
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This rather onerous onus upon the Crown ensures that the Crown engage in consultation in a 
meaningful way.148  
 In regard to the second question, the Court has set the trigger for consultation so low that 
the prevailing wisdom now is that there is always a duty to consult where Aboriginal and treaty 
rights are concerned.149  Specifically, the duty is triggered when “the Crown has knowledge, real 
or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates 
conduct that might adversely affect it.”150  Since consultation must be conducted when action is 
contemplated that could potentially affect an Aboriginal right, and may be based on real or 
constructed knowledge, the Court has clearly indicated that the duty applies in cases of unproven 
rights and also that consultation must take place as early as possible, such as in the strategic-level 
planning phase.151  This decision soundly rejects the Crown’s ‘only after’ argument, which had 
been employed with success in previous cases.152  The Crown had reasoned that the duty applies 
‘only after’ an Aboriginal right has been “definitively defined and proven,” because before that 
time “it could not know what rights were there to be respected.”153  In addition, the decision 
rejects the other Crown ‘only after’ policy, namely that it will consult with First Nations only 
after the major strategic decisions are made.  The Court reasoned that if consultation occurs only 
at the operational level, well after the conduct has been contemplated, then it “would have little 
effect and would be less meaningful.”154  The Court clearly indicated that the “Crown’s 
traditional strategy of hardball legalism” is unacceptable, and only “good faith” consultation 
based on “engagement, not denial or deference” will pass legal muster.155   
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 The answers to both questions are grounded in the honour of the Crown. In Sparrow, 
such honour was established as the “fundamental principle of the interpretation of aboriginal 
rights.”156  Specifically, the “honour of the Crown obliges the Crown to respect Aboriginal rights, 
which in turn requires it to negotiate with Aboriginal peoples with a view to identifying those rights. It 
also obliges the Crown to consult with Aboriginal peoples in all cases where its activities affect their 
asserted rights and, where appropriate, to accommodate these rights by adjusting the activities.157   
In situations where Aboriginal rights are claimed, but not yet proven, the fiduciary duty does not 
apply, but the Court has held that the honour of the Crown does.  With regard to third parties, 
since the honour of the Crown cannot be delegated to another party, the Crown is the sole legal 
bearer of the duty.  Overall, the impact of the ‘honour’ doctrine is that “even potential rights 
must be “determined, recognized and respected” through a process of consultation[...].”158   
 In contrast to its restrictive principles concerning the when of consultation, the how and 
what of the duty remain quite flexible.  The Court affirmed the sliding scale of consultation set 
out in Delgamuukw, whereby consultation ranges in nature and scope according to the degree of 
impact on the Aboriginal or treaty right and the nature of the right.159  However, since in the case 
of unproven rights, the duty is rooted in the honour of the Crown, rather than in fiduciary 
doctrine, the standard of consultation is downgraded,160 with the range of possibilities for claims 
not yet established in court or through negotiations less obligating.161  The requirement of 
consent, which is at the top of the spectrum in cases concerning established Aboriginal title, is 
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The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the circumstances.  In 
occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be no more 
than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held 
pursuant to aboriginal title.  Of course, even in these rare cases the minimum acceptable 
standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention 
of substantially addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at 
issue.  In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere consultation.  Some cases 
may even require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces  
enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands. 
 
160 Christie, 159. 
161 “In relation to claims that are not yet established in court or through negotiations the array ranges from a bare 
obligation to “...give notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice,..” up to an 
obligation that “...may entail the opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal participation in the 
decision-making process, and provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to 
reveal the impact they had on the decision.” (Christie citing Haida, 159. 
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noticeably removed from the range of possibilities for unproven rights.162  This lessening of the 
obligation of consultation may seem to lessen the duty owed by the Crown to First Nations, 
therefore allowing for decisions more consistent with Crown interests, and less negotiating 
power for First Nations.   
 However, the nature of the process for assessing the level of consultation for 
unestablished rights seems to necessitate increased and more meaningful negotiation between a 
First Nation and the Crown.  In order to assess the type of consultation that must be engaged in 
with respect to unestablished rights, the Crown must assess the prima facie evidence of rights 
and titles.  As with the conventional sliding scale, “the stronger the evidence, and the more 
significant the potential impact is on such rights and title, the greater the depth and scope of the 
consultation efforts.”163  In its assessment, the Crown must work closely with the First Nation to 
determine: “what point along the Court-created spectrum of consultation the First Nation will be 
engaged” and “what type of consultation activity will be adequate to satisfy the duty?”164   For 
this reason, the Crown has placed a reciprocal duty on the First Nation at this juncture to “outline 
their claims with clarity, focusing on the scope and nature of the Aboriginal rights they assert 
and on the alleged infringements.165  In addition, the Court has directed that the First Nation must 
negotiate in good faith and “not frustrate the Crown’s reasonable good faith attempts” or “take 
unreasonable positions to thwart government from making decisions.”166  In order for the Crown 
to make its initial assessment, it requires significant back and forth communication with the First 
Nation, and it has a vested interest in making the most accurate determination possible, because 
if the original assessment is later contested through litigation and is found to be incorrect as a 
result of its actions or lack thereof, then the Crown is held responsible.167  Also, in cases where 
the first part of the assessment is wrong, the Crown is held to a higher standard—of 
correctness—as compared to instances where its initial assessment may be accurate but its 
subsequent consultation or accommodating measures are found lacking; in this instance, it will 
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be held only to a standard of reasonableness.168  In addition, the wrong determination on the 
strength of the claimed right, may mean that, once the right is proven, then the consultation 
process will be deemed inadequate.  To aid in the negotiations, the Court has also suggested that 
the assessment be conducted by an independent tribunal rather than a government official.169  If 
the Crown’s consultation is found to go beyond or be consistent with the legal requirements set 
by the Court, once the right is proven, then there will be no need to re-initiate the entire 
consultation process or engage in further litigation, which in the long run will be less expensive 
and detrimental to Aboriginal-state relations.  Despite the strong incentives for meaningful 
negotiation, the decision in Taku River170 demonstrates that the appropriateness of a consultation 
process ultimately will not be dependent upon the capacity of negotiations to reach agreement, 
but must be determined on a case by case basis.171 
 In Mikisew, the Supreme Court decided that the two-part assessment not only applies to 
treaty situations, but provided additional factors for the Crown to consider if it is to negotiate 
meaningfully with a treaty First Nation.  These include:  “the specificity of the treaty promises” 
and “the history of dealings between the Crown and the First Nation.”172  In the words of the 
Court, the existing treaty was to be utilized to ““explain the relations” to “govern future 
interaction” between the Crown and the Mikisew people.”173   The Court rejects the view of the 
treaty as “a finished land use blueprint.”174  Instead, the Court regards the negotiation of the 
numbered Treaty 8 as “the first step in a long journey that is unlikely to end any time soon.”  
Such a perspective “underscores” the honour of the Crown and the “ongoing” purpose of 
reconciliation.175  The Mikisew case is also instructive as to what the Court will accept for 
minimum consultation, since the facts of the case dealt with a relatively minor infringement on 
surrendered lands which were expressly subject to the ‘taking up’ clause of the treaty. The 
requirements of minimal consultation must include tailored engagement with the First Nation 
rather than assuming that Aboriginal input will be included in general public consultation; the 
provision of all relevant information, not merely ‘giving notice’ of the Crown’s intended action; 
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a solicitation of and response to the First Nation’s concerns in order to address and minimize any 
adverse impacts on their treaty rights; and finally, it must consider the First Nation’s interests 
and how its actions would affect these interests. 176  Overall, the Court concluded in Mikisew that 
“the Crown has failed to demonstrate an “intention of substantially addressing [Aboriginal] 
concerns...through a meaningful process of consultation.”177   
 To a certain extent, the courts have also mandated a pre-consultation stage of negotiation, 
in keeping with the overall purpose of reconciliation.  The need for pre-consultation was 
explicitly stated in Gitxsan: “[th]e first step of a consultation process is to discuss the process 
itself.”178  Additionally, as per Mikisew, the Crown is obligated to “engage with the First Nation 
through a distinct consultation process.”  Granted, this distinctiveness may be incorporated into a 
general consultation process, such as an environmental review, as was the case in Taku River.  
However, post-Haida Nation, Taku River and Mikisew, the British Columbia provincial court in 
Huu-Ay-Aht179 has gone one step further by mandating that the consultation process not focus on 
procedure to the detriment of the substance or facts of a given situation.180   In essence, a one-
size-fits-all consultation process, such as the forest and range agreements implemented in BC—
which became the source of the dispute in Huu-Ay-Ah—may not be acceptable for every First 
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Nation, as they clearly were not in this situation.181   In Huu-Ay-Aht, the court ruled that the 
Crown must design its consultation processes in consideration of potentially affected Aboriginal 
interests.”182   This same notion was reinforced in Hupacasath FN183, where the court decided 
that the consultation process must take into account “the particular concerns of the potentially 
affected Aboriginal nation.”184  The implications of these decisions is that although pre-
consultation per se may not be explicitly mandated by the courts, it will be “impossible” for the 
Crown to design a consultation process that will “after the fact, satisfy a court that the Crown had 
put in place a reasonable process for consulting about, and possibly accommodating, potentially 
affected Aboriginal rights and title without consulting with the potentially affected Aboriginal 
nation(s) beforehand.”185  The fact that even the design of consultation cannot take place without 
input from the potentially affected First Nations is a definite improvement in relations between 
the two, as it mandates negotiation at the earliest point possible in the process and on terms 
acceptable to the parties. 
 Perhaps the most important aspect of consultation is its primary substantive component, 
the duty to accommodate. It speaks directly to the question of how substantive or sensitive to the 
rights being claimed the process must be.  However, its nature and scope have yet to be 
definitively addressed by the courts.  The outstanding questions are: when is the Crown’s duty to 
accommodate triggered; what accommodating measures will be required of the Crown to fulfill 
its duty;186 and how is the level of accommodation to be determined.  If the Court opts to focus 
on the substance of the duty, then probable answers to these questions can be formulated, which 
will have major impacts on the Aboriginal-state relationship.  
 Thus far, it would seem that the trigger for accommodation has been set relatively high.  
The duty does not come into play until the consultation process indicates that changes to the 
proposed Crown action are necessary.  Thus, accommodation represents “the responsiveness 
owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal concerns identified during the consultation process.”  Such 
a concept of the duty has led the Court to conclude in Haida Nation, and affirm in Mikisew, that 
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accommodation may not be necessary in all cases, only “if appropriate.”187  However, Passelac-
Ross and Potes point out that accommodation will be deemed unnecessary only for instances 
when the Aboriginal group is completely satisfied with the proposed action.  In their view, this is 
unlikely to happen, as “[m]ore often than not, legitimate concerns will arise that require changes 
to or even the dismissal of the whole proposal.  The correct mindset of the Crown in any 
consultation process should be to expect that its duty to accommodate will arise in most 
situations.”188  Thus, one may construe the duty to accommodate as having a low trigger, on par 
with the duty to consult.  The fact that accommodation will be mandated in every instance of 
consultation further removes the future possibility that the Crown will be able to implement 
unilateral action, based upon meeting minimal procedural requirements, rather than in 
consideration of how its actions will affect the rights in question.  
 Although the courts have provided some guidance on the content of accommodation, it 
ultimately will vary with the circumstances.189  Though the courts have not explicitly articulated 
a sliding scale of accommodation, one can be constructed from the principles already set out.190   
Just as with the duty to consult, the resulting substantive outcome or accommodation owed 
depends on whether a right is established or not.  The court in Delgamuukw stated that at the 
high-end of accommodation, in cases of established Aboriginal title, Aboriginal consent may be 
required.  However, the Courts have stated explicitly and repeatedly that Aboriginal people do 
not hold a veto power over proposed Crown action.191  Instead, in the absence of agreement, the 
Crown is called upon to ‘balance interests.’ 192  For all established rights, the minimum 
considerations that must guide accommodation, based on a purposive reading of Sparrow are as 
follows:  “to cause the least infringement possible, to give priority to Aboriginal interests, to 
avoid irreparable damage, to compensate, to recognize the Aboriginal preferred means of 
exercising their rights, etc. And to recognize that only demonstrably compelling and substantial 
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objectives can trump Aboriginal or treaty rights.”193  In addition, the Court in Haida Nation 
clearly describes the “preservation of the Aboriginal interest as the guiding principle of the 
process of consultation.”194 Essentially, as the Court in Mikisew ruled, the minimum 
accommodation required is the demonstrable incorporation of Aboriginal concerns into the 
proposed Crown action.195  Anything less constitutes simply “blowing off steam”196 or 
“participating in participation.”   
 The accommodation owed in cases of unproven rights is supposedly less than the case 
with established rights, but upon closer examination it may be on par.  In cases of unproven 
rights, the option of consent is removed from the range of possible accommodations, just as is 
the case with the duty to consult. In addition, accommodation appears to require a process based 
on the lesser standard of ‘balancing interests,’ as opposed to substantially addressing the 
concerns of Aboriginal peoples. 197  However, Christie points out that before any ‘balancing’ 
occurs, the principles guiding proven rights, e.g. least infringement possible, accordance of 
priority, etc., may also be required in the case of unproven rights, in instances “where a strong 
prima facie case for the asserted rights has been made out, and Crown activity seriously threatens 
the asserted rights.”198  This will be necessary in order to find the “satisfactory interim solution,” 
which is the ultimate aim of accommodation in cases of unproven rights, as stated by the Court 
in Haida Nation.199  In addition, Potes argues that if the Crown is going to truly effect 
reconciliation, it must first always address Aboriginal concerns by “incorporating in a 
substantive way the rights, interests and concerns of the beneficiaries,” before proceeding to 
other interests.  Potes defends her argument for greater rights protection on several grounds. 
First, “[t]he interest of the Crown in furthering its own or third parties’ economic interests cannot 
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override its obligation to protect constitutional rights”200; second, although accommodation may 
not be translated as a duty to agree, it must be regarded as ‘inclusive’ by Aboriginal people if it is 
to be workable;201 and finally, if the concerns of Aboriginal people are substantially incorporated 
and addressed, then the process of consultation has the potential to become a constitutional 
mechanism that “may capture intercultural allegiance.”202   Thus, the standard of accommodation 
can and should be set “sufficiently high to protect rights.”203  Only in this way can reconciliation 
truly be achieved.   
Additional analysis of Taku River and Haida Nation reaffirms that the courts now are 
insisting on negotiated settlements. Slattery argues that with these cases, s. 35 is recognized as a 
“generative constitutional order, which “mandates the Crown to negotiate with Aboriginal 
peoples for the recognition of their rights in a contemporary form that balances their needs with 
the interests of the broader society.”204  Similarly, Tzimas argues that these decisions “urge 
everyone to work together within the existing constitutional structure to find common ground 
and common solutions.”205   Even analysis of the case law that derives its raison d’être from 
administrative law recommends that government consultation guidelines “are not dependent 
upon minimalist legal interpretations of the case law regarding consultation.”206  Rather, they 
advocate that governments consult “broadly and thoroughly with Aboriginal people,” since in the 
long run it is less expensive than litigation and will result in greater certainty for industry.207    
They also recognize that even a procedural reading of the case law necessitates that consultation 
not only be “fair”, but that a “fair outcome” must also result from the process.208  
 Slattery also takes the rulings in Taku River and Haida Nation one step further than other 
legal scholars and practitioners, arguing that the Supreme Court has introduced a new function 
for s. 35.  Originally, s. 35 served only as the “basis for the judicial identification and protection 
of historical Aboriginal rights, through the application of general constitutional principles.”209  In 
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Slattery’s opinion, today, it “serves as a springboard for negotiations leading to just settlements, 
in which Aboriginal rights are recognized in a modern form and reconciled with the interests of 
the larger society.”210  The primary result of this paradigmatic change is a shift in viewing 
Aboriginal rights as static to dynamic.211  The dynamic view of Aboriginal rights “involves the 
active participation of indigenous peoples and the Crown in the identification of Aboriginal 
rights.”212  Historical rights are static, based on “the application of general legal criteria to 
historical circumstances.”213   Slattery does not perceive a major problem with reconciling the 
recognition of modern Aboriginal rights with larger societal interests, because he views the 
recent court decisions as representing a major paradigm shift in favour of Aboriginal rights.  In 
his view, the new paradigm of the Court views Crown sovereignty as simply “asserted” and 
being “de facto,” which means it is legally deficient “until there has been a just settlement of 
their [Aboriginal] rights through negotiated treaties.”214  In addition, since Aboriginal rights no 
longer must be proven to mandate consultation and accommodation; and must instead be 
negotiated with Aboriginal people, or through the achievement of “a just settlement of 
Aboriginal claims by negotiation and treaty,”215 the latest developments on consultation ring in a 
new era of Aboriginal rights discourse.  
 Although Tzimas recognizes that the Supreme Court in Haida Nation and Taku River 
emphasize reconciliation through negotiation, she believes that such a goal is unattainable for 
practical reasons.  Unlike Slattery, she does not believe that a major paradigm shift has occurred.  
She argues that the Court has ruled that “the diversity of interests, Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal alike can be reconciled within the unity of the principles of federalism encompassed 
by the Constitution.”216  To determine whether reconciliation is a practical goal, she first looks at 
how the concept was applied to Aboriginal discourse in 1996 with R. v. Van der Peet and in 
Delgamuukw, and whether the concept, as articulated in the Secession Reference case is 
applicable to Aboriginal issues.217  She concludes that according to the model of reconciliation 
set out by the courts, it’s implied that the: 
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“Aboriginal group advancing an assertion [of rights] and the relevant 
government decision makers, in conjunction in many cases with third party 
proponents, can evaluate the strength and credibility of the assertion, reach 
agreement on the scope and content of the assertion, and then fashion interim 
arrangements that presumably minimize the impact on the asserted rights, but 
in most instances, enable the particular activity to proceed.”218  
 
Tzimas then goes on to outline the practical problems with this prescription, based on the current 
federalist arrangement. First, she argues that this view of reconciliation presupposes that 
Aboriginal groups and government have equal bargaining power, when in fact, a number of 
issues tip the scales in government’s favour.  Even if the Honour of the Crown necessitates the 
government provision of resources for Aboriginal people to consult effectively, time would still 
be a barrier.  She writes, “Empowerment, capacity building and respect are the kinds of elements 
that are essential to the success of reconciliation.  That however cannot occur overnight.”219  In 
addition, Tzimas concludes that the “timelines for reconciliation are out of step with timelines 
for authorizing development.”  Lastly, Tzimas identifies that since consultation is now based 
mostly on unproven rights, once a right is proven or not in court, the victor can use this leverage 
to either demand less or more accommodating measures.220   In her view, such a development 
may make consultation a long, drawn out and contentious affair. 
 
Summary 
 In sum, the ultimate purpose of consultation is to reconcile Aboriginal and settler 
societies.  It is rooted in the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights, which is 
derived from the special and unique historical and political relationship between Aboriginal 
people and the Crown in Canada.  This duty is both procedural and substantive—concerned with 
both the process and outcome.  The proper approach to the duty to consult and accommodate 
arguably entails an emphasis on negotiation over litigation and on the recognition and 
affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights rather than minimal infringement.  The nature of the 
duty is not negative, meaning it is not meant simply to act as a minimal check and balance on 
unilateral Crown action, but represents a positive duty on the Crown.  The consultation process 
must be jointly developed and implemented, as any unilateral Crown action is inconsistent with 
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the process of substantially and demonstrably incorporating the concerns of Aboriginal people.  
In some instances, where Aboriginal title is established, the consent of Aboriginal people may 
even be required, but Aboriginal people cannot unilaterally veto the process or outcome either.    
 In addition, if Slattery is to be believed, the function of s.35 as mandated by the courts in 
Haida Nation and Taku River indicates a paradigm shift that addresses many of the overarching 
difficulties with Aboriginal rights discourse.  These include the notion of absolute Crown 
sovereignty, proof of Aboriginal rights, and the inability of Aboriginal rights to evolve. 
However, the practical problems outlined by Tzimas remain.  It appears that these practical 
problems emanate from the current federalist relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal 
people—essentially, the Crown has more resources and authority to assert its will.  This 
continuing power imbalance will undermine the process of reconciliation, which requires, at a 
minimum, a joint process for assessing the strength of a claimed right.  However, Tzimas’ 
criticism of the timing of consultation that leads to reconciliation need only be a barrier if 
political expediency is lacking.   
 In fact, the problem with the dictates of the court, ironically, seems to be that it conceives 
of a more equal relationship between the Crown and First Nations, than that which exists in 
practice.  The practical problems with consultation and the purpose of reconciliation outlined by 
Tzimas would actually be alleviated if the Crown were willing to concede more authority to First 
nations in decision-making on lands and resources and provide them with the funding to 
contribute equally to the process. If in deciding the strength of a claimed right, a more equitable 
process is instituted that includes the creation of an independent, impartial tribunal to resolve 
disputes, then reconciliation may actually be achieved.  If the process focuses on negotiation 
where agreement between the parties is achieved, then the likelihood of either party seeking 
litigation, after the fact, would decrease significantly. The requirement of funding for adequate 
consultation remains an outstanding issue in duty to consult and accommodate jurisprudence; 
however, the provision of funding for First Nation participation in Taku River constituted one of 
the criteria on which the Court decided that the consultation process had been adequate. 
 At first glance, it may appear that two key inconsistencies exist between treaty federalism 
and the case law on the duty to consult and accommodate.  First, no clearly defined area of 
autonomous jurisdiction is outlined for First Nations, where they may decide and regulate land 
and resources according to their own laws and customs.  However, the entire jurisdiction of lands 
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and resources can conceivably be regarded as an area of concurrent jurisdiction where the 
autonomy of both nations must be redefined in relation to the other to create an innovative 
transnational covenant or unity.  The substantial incorporation of First Nation interests coupled 
with the emphasis on rights protection should go a long way towards promoting a unified 
decision based on the values, interests and rights of both parties.  As suggested by the Supreme 
Court, and demonstrated through the historical practice of treaty federalism itself, where unity of 
purpose fails to be achieved, then an independent council can be the final arbiter, and not the 
courts.   
 The second issue concerns the lack of Aboriginal consent to the entire process.  Treaty 
federalism is dependent upon the mutual consent of the parties in order to work.  The problem is 
that the Canadian common law only entertains the possibility of Aboriginal consent in instances 
of established Aboriginal title, and even then, not necessarily in all cases. However, this issue is 
overcome to a certain extent by the requirements for consultation and accommodation that 
mandate a focus on incorporating the rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples and 
demonstrating this incorporation.  As well, the other principles that mandate minimal 
infringement, priority for Aboriginal interests, avoidance of irreparable damage, and recognition 
of the Aboriginal preferred means of exercising their rights, etc, not only during the process, but 
in its outcome, virtually amount to Aboriginal consent in practice.  As Christie points out, 
“While Aboriginal nations will not be able to use the duties to consult and accommodate as veto-
power over government decisions, the requirement that the Crown have its mind directed toward 
maintaining the core of the interests being asserted (so that future negotiations have things to 
serve as the subject matter of negotiations) should have the effect of turning the Crown into a 
more eager collaborator in negotiations.”221 
 However, the fact remains that the duty to consult and accommodate is situated within a 
larger Aboriginal rights discourse, which is almost exclusively dominated by non-Aboriginal 
notions of law and justice.  Under treaty federalism, even in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, no 
single nation can impose its autonomy on the other or the land.  However, as Slattery attests, the 
duty to consult and accommodate appears to be a pragmatic way to sweep away the colonialist 
mistakes of Canadian jurisprudence and politics, without having to entirely rebuild the 
foundations of Canadian federalism. To reiterate, in Haida Nation and Taku River, the purpose 
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of section 35 takes on a new role, becoming ‘a springboard for negotiations leading to just 
settlements, in which Aboriginal rights are recognized in a modern form and reconciled with the 
interests of the larger society.’  Such a purpose holds the promise of checking the inequities of 
current law and politics that elevate and maintain the sole authority of the Crown—the notion of 
absolute Crown sovereignty, the legal requirements for proof of Aboriginal rights, and the 
inability of Aboriginal rights to evolve.  However, if consultation is to truly serve the purpose 
outlined by Slattery and achieve reconciliation, it also entails entertaining the possibility that 
Aboriginal law, customs and traditions must also come to bear on the process.  This means 
recognizing that reconciliation is not simply a matter of “reconciling Aboriginal peoples to 
Canada,” rather it means “reconciling Canada to the existence of different social, cultural, and 
political indigenous entities within the state.”222  By unifying their actions and melding their own 
unique values and objectives into the process of consultation, better land and resource decision-
making will occur. 
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Chapter 4:  The New Relationship Policy in British Columbia  
A roadmap for navigating from the vision of treaty federalism to its embodiment in 
policy is useful if Saskatchewan is to realize its own ideal of a new relationship.  This next 
chapter looks closer at the policy in BC to determine how this jurisdiction has translated the 
vision of treaty federalism into reality.  The focus is on determining how power is shared 
between the province and First Nations on lands and natural resources, consistent with a treaty 
federalism relationship.  Although policy in this province does not constitute treaty federalism in 
its purest form, this jurisdiction seems to have made great strides in moving towards this 
destination.  Granted, its path has not been without its twists, turns and outright dead ends.  
British Columbia is experiencing a myriad of obstacles in its attempts to move towards a de facto 
form of treaty federalism that contemplates such a relationship in the virtual absence of any 
modern or historical treaty.  However, much can be learned from the efforts in BC, successful or 
not.  The most important aspect of this jurisdiction to keep in mind, however, is that it continues 
to move towards a treaty-federal arrangement with First Nations, despite its many challenges and 
obstacles.  
 
British Columbia 
The new relationship between the government of British Columbia and First Nations 
began to unfold with the recognition that Aboriginal title existed prior to Confederation, 
independent of Crown sovereignty.  The ‘old’ relationship with First Nations, which was 
characterized by the BC government’s denial of Aboriginal rights and title was successfully 
altered through First Nations opposition, primarily through successful legal action opposing 
resource development. 223  In order to secure ‘certainty’ of resource development, the 
government of BC became obligated to negotiate with First Nations.  According to Tennant, the 
realization that “the province’s refusal to negotiate was no longer politically and legally 
defensible” occurred in 1989.224  In 1990, the treaty-making process in BC laid the groundwork 
for a new relationship by effectively establishing new processes for government-to-government 
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negotiations and mechanisms concerning lands and resources.  As part of this new process, the 
BC Claims Task Force was established to address the issue of Aboriginal title.  The three-party 
task force, composed of representatives from the First Nations Congress, the provincial and 
federal governments, issued a series of historic recommendations that were to guide treaty-
making.  Most notably, the task force called for “a new relationship based on mutual trust, 
respect, and understanding—through political negotiations.”225  In 1993, a new protocol 
agreement was signed by BC and the First Nations Summit, setting out a government-to-
government relationship recognizing Aboriginal title and  the inherent self-government rights of 
First Nations and mandating regular meetings over a three-year period.226  
In 2005, The New Relationship document drafted by BC First Nations and the provincial 
government was signed in March 2005, officially articulating the principles and mechanisms that 
were to guide Aboriginal–state relations in the province.227  
 According to the document, the new relationship signifies an effort to balance First 
Nations and provincial Crown autonomy and interdependence.  Its three-paragraph vision 
statement begins with the oft-quoted acknowledgement from Delgamuukw that “We are all here 
to stay.”228  The rest of the statement sets out how this is going to occur.  It commits to a new 
government-to-government relationship that respects, recognizes and accommodates Aboriginal 
title and rights, but also offers respect for the respective laws and responsibilities of both parties.  
Then, it recognizes both Aboriginal and Crown title and jurisdiction, and promises to work 
towards their reconciliation.  The next paragraph stipulates that both parties “agree to establish 
processes and institutions for shared decision-making about the land and resources and for 
revenue and benefit sharing,” based on the existence of Aboriginal title.229  The jurisdictional 
aspect of Aboriginal title is then defined as the “inherent right for the community to make 
decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the right to have a political structure for making 
those decisions.”230  After articulating the inherent political rights flowing from Aboriginal title, 
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it justifies them according to “First Nations’ historical and sacred relationship with their 
territories” and their constitutional recognition in Section 35.  No accompanying justification is 
provided for the assertion of provincial Crown jurisdiction and title. 
 The last paragraph is both backward and forward-looking.  It recognizes that the 
‘historical’ relationship between the Province and Aboriginal people has resulted in the present, 
sub-standard, socio-economic situation of First Nations.  Then, it promises that the new 
relationship will work “to achieve strong governments, social justice and economic self-
sufficiency for First Nations which will be of benefit to all British Columbians and will lead to 
long-term economic viability.”231  A last stated intent of the new relationship vision is to 
celebrate the diversity of the parties and emphasize their commonalities.   
 The next section sets out four goals which focus on First Nation communities, culture and 
governments.  The first and last goals commit to eliminating the socio-economic gap in living 
conditions between First Nations and other British Columbians and protecting the cultures and 
languages of First Nations to ensure their survival.  The second goal further articulates that 
Aboriginal title entails the achievement of First Nations self-determination, which includes an 
“economic component” and jurisdiction over their lands and resources in accord with their own 
management structures. 232  The economic component is clearly a nod to resource revenue 
sharing.  With the third goal, a commitment is made to incorporate First Nation laws, knowledge 
and values in the management of lands and resources, consistent with the principle of 
sustainability.  
The principles to guide the new relationship call for new mechanisms, processes and 
institutional change that will make the vision a reality.  These include “integrated 
intergovernmental structures and policies to promote co-operation”; “recognition of the need to 
preserve each First Nations’ decision-making authority”; “mutually acceptable arrangements for 
sharing benefits, including resource revenue sharing;” and “dispute resolution processes which 
are mutually determined.”233  In addition, a principle to provide funding for these arrangements 
and their accompanying negotiations is also stated.234   
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 The elements of the action plan contained in the document reaffirm the commitment of 
the parties to work together, and translate the principles into specific actions.  These include: 
“identify institutional, legislative and policy changes to implement this vision and these action 
plans”; “establish effective procedures for consultation and accommodation;” and also include a 
review of the forestry sector consultation mechanism, Forest and Range Agreements.235   Lastly, 
the establishment and activities of a management committee and working groups are set out, 
with a date set for the development of the terms of reference, guidelines and timelines for the 
management committee and working groups.236   
The vision as stated suggests that the BC government is prepared to go beyond 
consultation to shared decision-making on lands and resources consistent with many of the 
principles of a treaty-based relationship.  The approach taken in implementing a new relationship 
in British Columbia is holistic, in that it does not compartmentalize the issues of duty to consult 
and accommodate, treaties and Aboriginal title as requiring separate approaches.  Instead, it 
recognizes that all are interconnected237, and require a consistent relationship between the 
province and First Nations.  The principles that must guide each are one and the same.   
It advocates a government-to-government relationship with First Nations; recognizes the 
inherent right of Aboriginal self-government consistent with distinctive traditions and practices 
of self-determination; and agrees that the stewardship of the land and its resources should be 
shared by First Nations and the provincial Crown.  This shared decision-making is also to occur 
at the level of content, process and implementation.238  It also allocates some separate space for 
First Nation decision-making authority by recognizing that self-determination is a part of the 
exercise of Aboriginal title.  In addition, the New Relationship articulates goals, a strategic 
vision, principles, action plans and a management committee and working groups to foster 
implementation of its vision.  The principles, although not suggesting that First Nations are 
nations, still purports to treat them as partners in the design and implementation of the new 
relationship. The level of specificity of the action plans indicates that the new relationship is not 
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simply rhetoric, but is a working strategy for restructuring the relationship between First Nations 
and the provincial Crown.   
To date, it seems that many of the actions identified in the new relationship document 
have indeed come to fruition.  The First Nations Leadership Council (FNLC), comprised of the 
political executives of the First Nations Summit, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs and the BC 
Assembly of First Nations, was created through a provincial Leadership Accord signed on March 
25, 2005. The Council works together to represent the interests of First Nations in British 
Columbia and develop strategies and actions to bring about significant and substantive changes 
to government policy that will benefit First Nations in the province.239  In addition, the Council 
meets regularly with provincial officials to “set direction, review progress and have high-level 
discussion on progress under the New Relationship and other matters of common concern.”240   
A number of working groups have also been established to deal with specific issues. 
These include: A joint FNLC-BC Recognition Working Group tasked with the main deliverables 
from the New Relationship document, which include creating principles and mechanisms for 
recognition and Honour of the Crown, consultation/accommodation and revenue sharing.  Other 
joint working groups achieving progress under the New Relationship include the Resolutions 
Strategy Side Table; Telling Our Stories Committee; Crown Land Allocation Framework 
Working Group; Aquaculture Working Group; and the Ecosystem Stewardship Planning 
Working Group.  The province also established the New Relationship Trust on March 31, 2006 – 
$100 million in funding intended to enhance the capacity of First Nations to participate in the 
processes and activities arising from the New Relationship.241 Lastly, the provincial government 
has implemented the Transformative Change Accord to eradicate the socio-economic gap 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in the province in the next ten years.242   
However, the vision falls short of treaty federalism in some key areas.  Its principles do 
not entail that equal consent of all parties on outcomes is required in order to move forward.  
Instead, the activities and practices need only “promote co-operation” or “practical and workable 
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arrangements” for decision-making on lands and resources.  The principle that perhaps goes the 
furthest in advocating equality among First Nations and the provincial Crown is the agreement 
that arrangements for sharing benefits must be “mutually acceptable.”  Perhaps the biggest issue 
with the vision statement is that the level of First Nation ‘self-determination’243 and the term 
‘shared decision-making’ are not defined244.  Self-determination may range from basic self-
administration of existing government programs within limited or circumscribed areas of 
jurisdiction to full First Nation autonomy in determining the design and implementation of all 
areas of jurisdiction directly impacting their members.  Sharing often connotes equality, but only 
partial decision-making powers dependent upon the will of the provincial government 
conceivably could be attributed to First Nations. In light of the new relationship document’s 
insistence on recognizing Crown title, jurisdiction and interests, it might be the case that First 
Nation interests will not receive equal weight in the case of a conflict.   
Due to the aforementioned vagueness of the New Relationship document, as well as its 
high-level political formulation, issues concerning differing interpretations of its vision and its 
implementation in various policy sectors have arisen. In 2006, the Interim Agreement on Forest 
and Range Opportunities,245 a new template for interim forestry agreements between the 
provincial government and First Nations, was implemented to apply the new relationship 
principles to the forestry sector.  The UBCIC initially rejected the FRO/A on the grounds that it 
failed to properly recognize and accommodate Aboriginal title or to enact shared decision-
making on “strategic, administrative and operational decisions.”246 However, that same year, the 
FNLC did agree to an acceptable FRO template.247 Since then, a report on the impact of the new 
relationship on the implementation of the Gitxaala Nation’s Forest and Range Agreement found 
that the new relationship vision is ‘ambiguous,’ which has led to “a lack of a shared 
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understanding concerning objectives and successful implementation.”248 In the case of the 
Gitxaala, this dissonance has not only prevented the establishment of a truly new relationship 
whereby the Crown and the Gitxaala Nation can implement the FRA, but also illustrates that 
“provincial policy without clear directives allows for interpretation by local policy implementers 
which is resulting in discrepancies in policy outcomes.”249  Furthermore, until the vision is 
“mutually understood” and is translated into clear policy and directives, then “the New 
Relationship and the FRA simply represent a ‘new’ Provincial tactic for the Province to maintain 
a hold on resources and create certainty for industry in an era of strengthened Aboriginal 
claims.”250 
 Yet, the FNLC continues to make progress in working with the BC government to 
manage the forestry sector. For instance, in 2006, the First Nations Forestry Council was created 
to represent BC First Nations interests in forestry-related matters, including working with other 
levels of government to ensure First Nations “needs, values and principles are factored into 
forestry-related policy and program development, including monitoring, evaluating, influencing 
and providing policy advice and research.”251 In addition the provincial Ministry of Forests and 
Range created a new First Nations Initiatives Division to improve consultation processes and 
provided Aboriginal law and cultural awareness training for over 1,000 government employees 
to improve “government’s ability to support the New Relationship.”252   
However, another report assessing how shared decision-making is being implemented in 
land use planning concludes that although the province of BC currently is engaging in 
collaborative decision-making or co-management of Crown land and resources with some BC 
First Nations, especially in the case of the recent North and Central Coast land use decision, only 
decisions concerning the planning process are shared, with the ultimate legal decision-making 
authority continuing to rest with the Crown.253  According to Kehler, such a status quo does not 
meet First Nations expectations in participating in statutory decision-making, whereby “they will 
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be more involved in making land use decisions and sharing in benefits that those decisions 
generate in their traditional lands.”254  
 Perhaps the most telling example of how the New Relationship vision is being interpreted 
and implemented is by examining the recently proposed Recognition and Reconciliation Act. 
Although no draft legislation was introduced in the legislature, the FNLC and the provincial 
government released a jointly developed discussion paper describing its proposed content in 
February 2009.255  Viewed as the “first priority” for implementing the new relationship, the 
purpose of the act was multifold.  It was supposed to recognize the Aboriginal rights and title of 
indigenously defined territories and governments, without legal proof, and “enable and guide” 
both the establishment of mechanisms for shared decision-making on lands and resources and 
revenue and benefit sharing agreements.256  In addition, it was to provide a vision and a new 
institution for reconstituting Indigenous nations according to their traditional territories and 
establish processes, mechanisms and a new institution for the resolution of disputes arising from 
the legislation and its pursuant regulations and agreements. The act was to be just one part of a 
“legislative package” that would develop regulations, template shared decision-making and 
revenue and benefit sharing agreements and a proclamation.257  The scope of the proposed act 
was broad, applying to “all ministries and provincial agencies,” and overriding or “tak[ing] 
priority over” all other provincial statutes that deal with lands and resources.258   
 The “Recognition Principles” set out on in the  discussion paper include the recognition 
of the inherent political rights of First Nations, independent of Crown sovereignty, and again, 
recognize pre-existing Aboriginal rights and title within the territory of each Indigenous nation, 
without legal proof.259 There is also a recognition that Aboriginal and Crown title exist 
throughout British Columbia, which create “obligations and responsibilities.”  Aboriginal title is 
also recognized to have a “jurisdictional and economic component.”  Existing treaty rights in 
British Columbia that must be “honourably implemented” are also recognized.  Lastly, the act 
recognizes that “the relationship between Indigenous Nations and the Crown is a government-to-
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government relationship in which both parties exercise authority to make decisions including 
about how the lands and resources will be used and the resources shared.”   
 The act proposes three levels of engagement—comprehensive, interim and default.260  At 
the comprehensive level, all the recognition principles of the act will be applied through 
collaboratively-developed agreements concerning shared-decision making and revenue sharing 
within the territory of Indigenous Nations, in an effort to harmonize Crown and indigenous 
processes and decisions. Such comprehensive application will only occur if First Nations 
reconstitute themselves according to traditional territory boundaries.  In the case of interim 
negotiations, the province will make decisions with the FNLC and the recognition principles will 
be applied through agreements that apply only to certain specified categories of development 
projects and defined “strategic decisions.”   Revenue sharing is restricted to portions of 
provincial revenue from the specific projects or decision.   An additional principle will be 
applied to this engagement, whereby the decisions taken must seek to accommodate rather than 
compromise the interests of the parties.  Default engagement seeks to go beyond the status quo to 
apply recognition principles based on a mutually-agreed upon framework that would set out how 
provincial engagement must analyze impacts on Aboriginal rights and title and treaty rights, 
rather than focusing on the strength of a right or title claim.    
 Also proposed in the act is an amendment to the BC Constitution Act to enable a Council 
of Indigenous Nations.261  Its mandate has yet to be determined, but will be the result of 
agreement between the FNLC and the provincial Executive Council.  Until the nation-building 
process is complete, the council will be made up of FNLC members.   Although it is hoped that 
the resolution of disputes will occur over the course of discussions, a stipulation for enabling 
formal mediation and dispute resolution, possibly a tribunal, regarding the act and its 
implementation, will be provided.   The last section stipulates that as part of the proposed act, a 
proclamation will be issued that “should be eloquent and poetic,” in stating the history of British 
Columbia, from the pre-contact era to colonization to the present day, which is described as “a 
point in our collective history where there is huge opportunity to turn the page of history and 
establish a new relationship of respect and recognition.”262   The intent of the proclamation is to 
educate all citizens and to foster reconciliation.   
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 The recognition legislation as set out does seem to advocate a treaty federalist 
relationship between First Nations and the province.  By recognizing the laws, governments, 
political structure, territories and rights of First Nations, their autonomy is maintained.  In 
addition, mechanisms are proposed for sharing in the decision-making on lands and resources, in 
order to promote harmonious interdependence.  The recognition of both Crown and Aboriginal 
title, without legal proof of either, indicates that the imported common law of one nation will not 
take precedence over the relationship. Moreover, the recognition of Crown title actually puts the 
proposed legislation on par with a treaty, because it provides consent for the settlement and 
development of the land where no prior legitimacy exists through natural ‘inheritance’ by the 
settler population.  As well, the proposed act implicitly addresses many of the common 
objections raised against treaty federalism.  The diversity of First Nations is addressed through 
the aggregation of First Nations along traditional territorial borders, but still according to their 
own political structures and capacities, which provides a practical basis for negotiations and the 
implementation of decisions, albeit assymetrically. The proposed proclamation would serve as a 
modern-day royal proclamation that would help educate the public about the special relationship 
between Aboriginal people and the Crown, which would help in overcoming the conventional 
view of federalism as existing only between the provincial and federal Crowns.  The proposed 
act also addresses the lack of legitimacy towards the current federalist relationship held by many 
First Nations, because now they are active participants in the creation of this new federal 
relationship.  The incremental approach, of proceeding from default to interim to comprehensive 
levels of engagement, would also assist First Nations in furthering their capacity to govern and in 
creating the political will necessary to revise the ‘old’ relationship structure.  The legislation also 
goes one step further, offering a template for dispute resolution, when agreement cannot be 
reached through intercultural dialogue.  
 However, as with the original New Relationship document, the act itself still fails to 
define what is meant by shared decision-making or set out the specific roles and responsibilities 
concerning the joint application of Crown and Aboriginal title.  The only clarification offered in 
the legislation is the assertion that the act will not affect the status of existing interests or tenures 
in land and resources already granted by the province or the constitutional and common law of 
Aboriginal rights and title and treaty rights.  In addition, the act clarifies that it does not alter 
“positively or negatively” the federal-provincial division of powers or the jurisdiction of any 
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indigenous nation under the constitution, nor does it create any “new constitutional rights or law-
making authority.”263  Such clarification is somewhat perplexing, as how can a new commitment 
to share decision-making authority not alter the powers or jurisdiction of the province or 
Indigenous nations, positively or negatively? Doesn’t the concept of shared decision making 
with First Nations necessitate the ceding of some provincial authority on lands and resources?   
 The Union of BC Indian Chiefs released four discussion papers on the proposed 
legislation, one of which offers much-needed clarification on shared decision-making.  The four 
papers were disseminated prior to a November 2008 Chiefs Forum, and discuss shared decision-
making; revenue and benefit sharing; proper title and rights holder; shared territories/overlap 
resolution mechanism; and tools for shared decision-making – databases/information 
management. 264   The discussion paper on shared decision-making distinguishes this process 
from consultation, defining it as “a process where decision-makers with respective jurisdictions, 
authorities and laws engage in a joint process of decision-making towards reaching compatible 
or common decision.”265  It entails accepting that both the Crown and the First Nations will make 
decisions, so that the central question becomes “how will Crown and First Nation decision-
makers interact in making their respective decisions?”266   
 Five models of decision-making are offered, ranging from low levels of interaction to 
high levels of interaction between First Nations and the Province.267  At the low interaction end,  
separate areas of decision-making authority for First Nations and the province are presented, 
with the separate spheres of jurisdiction gradually increasing in interaction, from parallel 
decisions made with limited interaction to parallel decision making processes with intensive 
interaction, to a joint recommendation body with two decisions, and finally a joint institution 
with decision-making authority.  Underlying all of these models is the authority of First Nations 
to make their own decisions.  The major problem with most of the models of decision making is 
that two separate decisions are allowed, which does not address the problem of how to reconcile 
the interests and rights of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies.  At the end of the day, if the 
decisions are inconsistent with one another, then who will become the final arbiter? This issue is 
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raised in the discussion paper itself.  However, as the level of interaction increases, the likelihood 
of a mutually acceptable decision actually increases.  For instance, “category 5: Joint Institution 
with Decision Making Authority – One Joint Decision” would mean that “The Crown and the 
First Nation(s) establish a joint institution to which they each delegate, consistent with their own 
laws, the power to make binding decisions. At the end, there is one decision made, by the joint 
institution.”268  The discussion paper does not recommend the implementation of any of the 
models of shared-decision, only noting that unilateral Crown decision-making is not an option.  
Kehler also offers a spectrum of possibilities for shared decision-making between the province 
and First Nations.  However, she recommends that the province and First Nation seek to share 
jurisdiction and statutory decision-making or what she calls “co-jurisdiction and ownership”, 
either through treaty-making or the formal delegation of authority to First Nations through 
legislation.269  The FNLC further clarifies its stance on shared-decision-making in its response to 
some objections to the legislation.  It clarifies that First Nations consent is not being demanded 
as a requirement of shared decision-making.  Instead, since the province and First Nations have 
already agreed to set out a dispute resolution process, then a mutually-agreed upon process for 
reaching agreement will ultimately decide the final outcome, which likely will not require the 
consent of the First Nation for moving forward.  However, mutual consent to the dispute 
resolution process is required, and although not a direct endorsement of a decision, such an 
approach is in keeping with the treaty-federalist principles of mutual consent and cooperation.  If 
shared decision-making follows the recommendations of Kehler, or proceeds to the final and 
most interactive stage of decision-making presented by the UBCIC, then the new relationship 
legislation would indeed be fostering in a new treaty federalist arrangement between the 
province and First Nations. However, both Kehler and the UBCIC agree that the status quo is 
characterized by unilateral Crown decision-making at some point in the decision-making 
process, which is inconsistent with the commitment to a new relationship and the concept of 
treaty federalism. 
 Despite the merits of the proposed legislation, it has drawn opposition from both 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal constituents.270  Although not necessarily representative of the 
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non-Aboriginal citizens of BC, two legal scholars released and disseminated widely, some 
objections to the paper.  Their major objection is that the proposed legislation proposes too much 
power for First Nations, effectively giving them a veto over land and resource decisions.  They 
also take issue with the recognition of Aboriginal title and the concept of such a relationship 
being forged between the provincial Crown and First Nations, stating that ‘Indians’ fall under 
federal jurisdiction according to section 92 of the Constitution Act.   
 First Nations take issue with the proposed legislation for a number of reasons.  The 
discussion paper on revenue and benefit sharing raises doubts about the actual implementation of 
the new relationship and its proposed legislation. The UBCIC criticizes the provincial 
government’s new framework for revenue sharing in the mining sector, stating that it was 
unilaterally developed and ignores negotiations between the FNLC and BC towards mutually 
developed frameworks for shared decision-making and revenue and benefit sharing.271  
Specifically, UBCIC takes issue with the BC government’s proposal to tie resources for First 
Nations to demonstrated socio-economic purposes and to confine First Nations participation to 
the project approval process.272  The BC First Nations believe that this form of revenue sharing is 
inconsistent with the commitment to a “shared decision-making role, based on co-existing 
titles.”273  Such a practice by the province casts a long shadow on whether the new relationship 
and its enabling legislation truly will light the way to shared decision-making.  In addition, upon  
reviewing the proposed legislation, First Nation citizens rejected its contents based on the 
following:   “'reconstitution' will interfere with self-determination; that the Indigenous Nation 
Commission could become another bureaucracy; that there is risk of including Aboriginal title 
recognition in legislation which also recognizes Crown title in any form; that the nature, scope 
and substance of the title being recognized will weaken the title recognition within s. 35.”274  In 
addition, concerns also were raised as to whether the provincial Crown has the jurisdiction to 
enact such legislation and whether the federal government must play a bigger role in 
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negotiations. As a result of the concerns expressed from First Nations across BC, the FNLC set 
aside the proposed legislation on June 25, 2009, and has since decided to redirect its focus from 
legislative drafting to an “inclusive and cohesive dialogue” with the province.275 
 In sum, it would seem that the new relationship, as agreed upon by the province and First 
Nations, is on par with treaty federalism.  However, some ambiguous phrasing must be clarified 
between the parties, before the relationship truly can proceed in this direction. In addition, the 
implementation of the new relationship thus far appears to be inconsistent with the vision in 
some respects, which is causing problems with its further advancement.  Perhaps, the biggest 
lesson that may be learned from BC is that the realization of a treaty-federalist relationship is 
possible if the political will exists on both sides to clarify what exactly it means and then proceed 
in unity towards designing legislation, frameworks and mechanisms for its realization.  The 
proposed options for shared decision-making offered by the UBCIC and the recommendations of 
Rogers and Kehler provide good starting points for advancing a new relationship built on the 
principles of treaty federalism.  
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Chapter 5:  Forging a New Relationship in Saskatchewan 
 
This chapter examines the current policy environment in Saskatchewan as it relates to the 
design and implementation of a provincial consultation policy with First Nations on lands and 
resources.  As has been discussed, it is clear that a consultation policy is a much-needed and 
timely instrument important to the future well-being of the province.  It impacts not only the 
relationship between First Nations and the Province, but is a matter of good governance 
necessary for enhanced economic and social development.  It is important to note that the current 
consultation policy remains a work in progress, with no final endpoint at this time.  The analysis 
presented here represents a relatively short window from May 2008 to April 2010.  This window 
corresponds very closely with the short time frame in which the Saskatchewan Party has had an 
opportunity to truly forge a better and new relationship with First Nations in Saskatchewan.  
The outstanding issues that must be overcome in order for the parties to agree on a 
consultation process can be identified in the Province’s latest draft consultation framework.  At 
the heart of many of the issues is what the Crown refers to as the ‘treaty context,’ whereby 
entrenched positions on both sides of the treaty divide are preventing the parties from reaching 
enough common ground to support consultation.  The “Treaty context” is described in the draft 
framework as a fundamental source of conflict.   
 
Unfortunately, different interpretations of the Treaty intent and of individual clauses 
have contributed to some fundamentally different interpretations of the duty to consult 
and accommodate. First Nations have said they do not accept that the written text of the 
treaties is an accurate record of what was agreed to in the Treaties and that they did not 
agree to the blanket extinguishment of their Aboriginal title by entering into the Treaty 
relationship.  
 
Treaty First Nations often assert that they intended to share the territory, and 
jurisdiction and management over it, as opposed to ceding the territory, even where the 
text of an historical Treaty makes reference to a blanket extinguishment of land rights. 
Frequently, First Nations will state that they agreed to share the land to the depth of a 
plough. Thus, in the First Nations’ view, the mineral resources below the surface were 
not ceded to the Crown and therefore still belong to, or the very least, must be shared 
with First Nations. While this is a commonly held First Nation Perspective, it is not one 
that has been accepted by the courts or by governments. 
 
[...] 
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From Government’s point of view, the purpose of the numbered Treaties entered into 
between First Nations and Canada was to create a new relationship between the Crown 
and First Nations. A key element of the Treaties was the extinguishment of Aboriginal 
title in order to open up the west for the peaceful settlement of Saskatchewan, and in 
return, First Nations received commitments that would provide for the continuation of 
their customs, lifestyles and traditions. As a result of the Treaties, any rights that First 
Nations had in the land, including the resources below the surface, were extinguished, 
subject to the rights set out in the Treaties.276 
 
Although recognizing that the First Nations have a different perspective on the treaties, the 
Crown quickly concludes that such a perspective is unsupportable, and proceeds to outline a 
consultation process based on its own interpretation of the treaties.   Such a stance seems a little 
hasty, given the fact that First Nations in Saskatchewan place paramount importance on 
honouring and implementing the treaties.  As was mentioned, the treaties are the foundation of 
First Nation political action.  In addition, the stance of the provincial government in this regard 
seems to forgo the very purpose, or at the very least, the potential of consultation, which is to 
determine how the interests and rights of Aboriginal people will be balanced with provincial 
objectives.   
 Since the Crown is unwilling to entertain or discuss the historical significance of the 
treaties to Saskatchewan First Nations in relation decision-making on land and resources, then a 
key subject area is exempted from the consultation process.  The important subject omitted from 
consideration is ‘sharing in the Province’s economic growth,’277 which is a thinly veiled 
reference to First Nations’ request for resource revenue sharing.  This request is based on the 
‘First Nation Perspective’ of the treaties—since First Nations believe they never ceded their 
rights to the land, including mineral rights, then they argue that they are entitled to a portion of 
the revenue from development of these resources.  However, as was mentioned, this stance has 
been declared illegitimate by the Province, and so the proposed policy does not consider this 
issue.  The provincial rejection of a resource revenue-sharing agreement with First Nations has 
been explicitly stated as a major impediment to reaching an agreement on consultation.278    
In addition, one of the ‘key principles’ of the policy is its exemption of authorization and 
approval of mineral dispositions from consultation.279  First Nations also have cited this 
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exemption as unacceptable.280  It would seem that decisions regarding the staking of claims by 
mineral companies constitute major land use decisions with the potential to seriously impact 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.  However, the Crown has refused to allow for any First Nations 
input into this type of land use planning.  The practical reason, of course, is that consultation on 
this issue will slow the pace of resource development, suggesting that such development is the 
major interest driving the Crown’s negotiation of a consultation process, and not the protection 
of rights, as is mandated by the courts.  This unilateral action by the Crown, again, is based on its 
understanding that all mineral rights to the land were ceded by First Nations through treaty. 
The supremacy of Crown sovereignty also is rooted in the Crown’s interpretation of the 
treaties.  The emphasis in the consultation policy on unilateral Crown action is a manifestation of 
this position. From beginning to end, you have a provincial Crown in control of the whole 
process.  The Crown recognizes that it bears the onus of assessing the potential impact a 
proposed activity will have on a specific right, but then appears to assume that this responsibility 
means it can unilaterally make this assessment. Although the draft framework states that 
assessing the impact of a proposed action on a right will be determined through consultation281, 
the following spectrum of consultation and the steps for assessing impact, belie such a statement.  
The range of consultation includes the following four levels:  notification, limited, moderate and 
intensive.  At the level of notification, the “[a]ssessment of the potential impact on rights is to be 
conducted by government and submitted to the First Nation or Métis group.”  If “any comments” 
are received during the notification stage, then they will be considered.  This assessment 
perceives of a Crown acting alone to assess the potential impact of its proposed activity on a 
right, and then informing the First Nation of its findings. It fails to mention that this assessment 
must be made with input from the potentially affected Aboriginal group.  In order for the Crown 
to make an accurate and balanced assessment, it requires significant back and forth 
communication with the First Nation; not merely the provision of information to the First Nation 
after the fact.  All the subsequent levels build upon this initial assessment.  
The more specific enunciation of the ‘Steps in the Consultation Process’  begins with 
Government assessing who is to be consulted, the potential impact on the Aboriginal and/or 
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treaty right, if consultation is necessary, and if so, what level of consultation is mandated.282  
This assessment is made “with information at hand.”283  The source of this information is a 
mystery, especially since the need for traditional use studies and plans has not been deemed 
necessary until the intensive stage of consultation, and even then it may not be required.  
However, “When in doubt, Government may communicate with the First Nation or Métis 
leadership to validate its determination. [emphasis added]”284 So, the intent of consultation is not 
to work and communicate with First Nations to clearly understand the nature of their rights and 
the potential impact upon them, but simply to validate decisions that have already been made by 
the Crown without it necessarily seeking further information to make its decision.   
However, during Step 2, the process does allow for an affected First Nation to make its 
own assessment, which may result in a reassessment of the Crown decision.  There are also 
provisions made here for more information to be provided from Government and industry, but 
oddly, not from the First Nation, and only if deemed necessary.  By step 3, the consultation 
phase has already arrived at the stage of accommodation.  It is important to note that in this 
section, a bias towards development rather than rights protection is apparent.  In instances where 
accommodation is deemed necessary, and changes to the proposed activity are insufficient to 
protect the right, then the “appropriate accommodation” will be assessed.  It seems implied that 
this ‘appropriate accommodation’ really entails compensation for rights infringement rather than, 
perhaps, halting development, especially since the “impact on project timing and cost” is a 
consideration during this stage.  
For the most part, the entire spectrum of consultation does not provide any provisions as 
to how the Province will demonstrate that it has incorporated First Nation concerns into its 
proposed plan of action.   During the notification stage, “a response [to any concerns] is not 
required prior to a decision to approve an action.”285  Even at the moderate and intensive levels, 
consultation seems to entail simply the sharing of information and the identification of issues 
related to impacts on Treaty or Aboriginal rights, and discussion over possible mitigation 
measures. At the latter two stages, rather than pinpointing exactly how feedback from First 
Nations will be incorporated, it is mentioned that more discussion will take place at these stages 
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over how to consult.286  In addition, the intensive level of consultation does not differ 
significantly from the moderate level, except that more time and the introduction of traditional 
use studies or land use plans may be required. Thus, even during the process of consulting, the 
Crown supposes that it may act unilaterally to determine when the First Nation has been 
sufficiently consulted.  Only at the final stage, after it is determined that the proposed activity 
will proceed, does the government interpret itself as obligated to “report back” to the affected 
First Nations on how its concerns were incorporated into the proposed plan of action.287  
Lastly, the proposed policy emphasizes throughout its various elements that the Province 
is also in control of the outcome of the process. In the ‘key principles’ section, the fact that 
Aboriginal people do not have a veto over consultation is noted, while no mention is made of the 
specific limits on Crown unilateralism, such as to cause the least infringement possible, to give 
priority to the Aboriginal interest, etc. Then, in the first paragraph immediately before the 
specific consultation steps are set out, one is reminded that, ultimately, it is the Province with the 
authority to make the final decisions under the process.288 In addition, no accompanying mention 
is made of the additional limiting factors on provincial Crown decisions where treaties are 
concerned.  Given the prevalence of treaties in the province, it would be prudent to mention the 
special consideration that must be given to treaties as set out by the Supreme Court rulings, but 
the policy is silent in this regard.  Finally, in the final step of the process, it is emphasized that 
agreement from First Nations and Métis is not necessary when the final decision is made by the 
Province.289    
Another way in which the unilateralism of the provincial Crown is supported through the 
policy is an emphasis on minimal infringement as opposed to rights protection.  Perhaps the most 
telling indication of the province’s minimalist approach is the fact that the policy is regarded as 
being applicable to only one Treaty right:  “Although the obligation [to consult] can arise with 
respect to any Treaty or Aboriginal right, this policy focuses on the exercise of a right to hunt, 
fish and trap for food.”  This position is again stated in one of its key principles of consultation: 
“The Crown has an obligation to assess the potential impact a proposed activity will have on 
hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering for food, as well as on spiritual and ceremonial sites, and 
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to clearly communicate its findings to the First Nations or Métis community/ies being 
consulted.”  The assumption that consultation likely will only arise in this context is counter to 
the duty’s twin purposes of negotiating and protecting Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The policy 
deals only with a single relatively established right, when it must also consider the impact that its 
actions will have on unproven Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  Most importantly, this approach 
precludes the possibility that consultation may lead to the recognition and affirmation of other 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, because only one type of right is admitted for consideration.  
At its most basic, the proposed policy fails to fully grasp the important role that 
Aboriginal people must play in consultation.  Under the ‘key process elements’ it is stated simply 
that “First Nations and Métis groups being consulted should have a say in how they would like to 
be consulted, particularly where there is potential for occasional to intensive impacts on rights. 
They should be involved in the process design and ideally, there should be agreement on how 
consultation will take place, within reasonable timelines and resources. [emphasis added]”290  
The Crown seems to be downplaying the importance of Aboriginal input into the design and 
implementation of consultation, by equating it as being on the same level as agreement on the 
outcome.  Aboriginal feedback and participation must be an element of the process, whereas only 
agreement should be described as an optional feature.  Even that, as has been demonstrated in the 
previous delineation of the duty to consult and accommodate jurisprudence is somewhat of an 
overstatement.  
Lastly, the lack of a definitive dispute resolution process291 within the consultation 
process also speaks to the asserted power of the Crown to act unilaterally.  Dispute resolution has 
not been identified as an integral part of the process, because when disagreement occurs the 
Crown will be the sole decision-maker.  This means that, if First Nations believe a Crown 
decision to be unjust, their only recourse will be civil disobedience and/or litigation. As well, 
without a dispute resolution process, the risk that Crown infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty 
right will result in irreparable damage rises, which may leave only limited accommodation as the 
possible redress.  In both instances, consultation will be a failure, which is why it is imperative 
that a dispute resolution process be built into the design of the consultation process. 
                                                
290 Ibid., 7. 
291 Ibid., 3. 
65 
 
 Overall, the proposed policy not only fails to take into account the First Nation 
commitment to honouring the Spirit and Intent of the treaties, it practically represents the 
antithesis of such a position.  On the whole, the FSIN believes that the draft policy puts too much 
control of lands and resources into the hands of government and corporations.292   It wants a 
more equal relationship with the Crown, especially when it comes to lands and resources.  This 
stance, again, is rooted in the First Nation understanding of a just treaty relationship.  As the 
jurisprudence on duty to consult and accommodate indicates—the principles to guide 
consultation between the Crown and First Nations have the potential to bring about a more 
equitable partnership—but the political will must be present in order to realize the promise of the 
Court’s dictates.  
 
Why Treaty Federalism in Saskatchewan? 
Drawing upon its twenty-year involvement in political and scholarly work on the subject 
of treaties in Saskatchewan, the federally-mandated, Office of the Treaty Commissioner (OTC), 
has released a comprehensive plan for how to approach First Nation - Crown relations based on 
the treaties in Saskatchewan. It is titled Treaty Implementation:  Fulfilling the Covenant.293  The 
OTC was established in 1989 to review issues on the treaty land entitlement process and 
education in Saskatchewan and is credited largely with finding a workable process for resolving 
specific entitlement claims in an efficient and effective manner.294   The OTC has not only 
commissioned valuable scholarship on the written and oral records of treaty-making in 
Saskatchewan, the office has strived to move First Nation – Crown relations towards a better 
understanding of the treaties.  It has facilitated the Exploratory Treaty Table, between Canada 
and First Nations in Saskatchewan, with the Province as an observer, which has resulted in a 
number of political developments and documents, such as common understandings on 14 treaty 
principles underlying the treaty relationship.295  In addition, in 1996, it co-established, with the 
Province and First Nations, a Common Table to “facilitate effective processes for negotiating 
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and implementing First Nations governance in Saskatchewan building on the treaty relationship, 
and for related jurisdictional and fiscal arrangements, in addition to discussions of treaty issues 
that affect all three parties.”296  This Saskatchewan-based office is regarded as being on the 
forefront of treaty discussions and public education. 297  Its mandate has been broadened in its 
twenty years of work, so that it is now responsible for facilitating discussions and making 
recommendations on the resolution of treaty issues.   
For the OTC, fulfilling the covenant made between Canada and First Nations in 
Saskatchewan means a fulfillment of their respective treaty obligations or, simply, 
implementation of the treaties.  It would seem that the Crown has been able to achieve its 
objectives under the treaties, but the same cannot be said for First Nations: 
 
The First Nations and Canada had their own goals and objectives when they came together 
to make treaties. Their collective common goals were to determine how they were going to 
live in harmony, with mutual benefit based on mutual respect, and to determine how First 
Nations were going to be part of the new economy that the newcomers were bringing.  
Unfortunately, these common goals have not been defined or achieved within a 
comprehensive treaty-based framework. The objective of the Crown, to settle and prosper 
on this new land without conflict from First Nations, has been achieved. Those of the First 
Nations, to share economic prosperity with the new society, secure a brother-to-brother 
relationship with the Crown, continue to nurture their communities and protect their right to 
govern themselves, have not. In order to implement the treaty relationship and fulfill the 
promise of the treaties, there needs to be revitalization based upon four pillars of 
reconciliation: political, legal, socio-economic, and spiritual. Each of these is equally 
important and should be given equal weight by the Parties.298  
 
Although focused upon the relationship between Canada and First Nations, the document 
also describes the role that the provincial Crown must play in implementing the treaties.  The 
Province has adopted a “position of non-participation,” asserting that “it was not a Party to the 
treaties, since the province did not exist at the time all but one of the treaties were negotiated, 
and consequently has no policy framework to mandate participation by the Crown in right of 
Saskatchewan in discussions to examine and implement the treaties and the treaty 
relationship.”299  This stance seems a bit odd, given the Saskatchewan government’s enjoyment 
and full implementation of its constitutional powers, even though the province did not exist 
during Confederation when the Constitution Act, 1867 was negotiated.   In addition, Coates and 
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Poelzer point out that Canada is a federation founded on “compound monarchies,” whereby the 
Crown has always been “divided” between federal and provincial authorities, each “led by their 
own powerful executives in possession of sovereignty in their own right.”300  Despite its 
compound nature, the Crown in Canada is “a basic principle organizing governance in 
Canada.”301  This translates into a political environment where, although separate, the provincial 
and federal Crowns act as a unifying force in Canada, sharing the sovereignty of the nation.  For 
a province to unilaterally fail to acknowledge or incorporate the precise nature of the Crown in 
its dealings runs counter to the federal structure upon which the nation was built.  On the flip 
side, First Nations must also acknowledge that the Crown with which they signed historical 
treaties includes provincial governments, and so they too ought to be willing to discuss the 
treaties with the province.  
The OTC states that the Province’s position is unsustainable “if it becomes a barrier to 
treaty implementation.”302  In fact, the province’s current position of non-participation is a 
barrier to treaty implementation.   Whenever a modern-day treaty has been implemented, the 
province has played a vital role in the process, because many of the areas of jurisdiction covered 
by such treaties fall under provincial authority.303  While the province may not have to play a 
role in treaty-making, it is a key player in treaty implementation.304   As a matter of basic 
practicality, the province must participate in treaty implementation, whether modern or 
historical, because it must negotiate with First Nations on how jurisdictions currently under its 
authority will be shared under the terms of a treaty.  If it refuses to do so, it will be impossible to 
implement any treaty in that province.  As Russell notes, “the federal government has no 
mandate to negotiate the powers of the provincial governments found in Section 92 [of the 
Constitution Act, 1867].”305  Here, we run again into the reality of a divided Crown in Canada. 
 The OTC recommends that high-level government officials “turn their minds to the 
potential impact of their work upon the rights and interests of the many Treaty First Nations.”306  
In fact, the report proposes the definition of a role for Saskatchewan in implementation.307  A 
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treaty implementation framework agreement is recommended that includes negotiations to define 
and implement inherent (Aboriginal) and treaty rights; allow for the orderly exercise of First 
Nations’ rights to hunt, fish, trap and gather renewable resources; and that First Nations’ access 
to renewable resources and revenues from resource exploitation are settled through 
negotiation.308  All the elements included in this proposed treaty implementation framework 
agreement mirror the issues that the province refuses to discuss within the scope of consultation. 
Just when will these matters be discussed, let alone resolved, if not through consultation?   
Although the Province has engaged in some action supportive of greater self-governance 
for First Nations, it continues to hold the treaties at arms-length from its relationship with First 
Nations.  The Province has recognized the inherent right of self-government for First Nations,309 
and, tripartite negotiations at the Common Table focusing on a comprehensive, final self-
government agreement have led to the initialling of a draft tripartite agreement in principle being 
signed in 2003 between the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN), Canada and 
Saskatchewan.310  Meanwhile, negotiations at the Exploratory Table have resulted in a bilateral 
protocol between the FSIN and Saskatchewan to guide relations between the two governments.   
However, both agreements continue to maintain that the “primary relationship between 
Saskatchewan First Nations and the Crown is, and will continue to be, between those First 
Nations and Canada” and the relationship between the Province and First Nations is one of a 
working relationship. 311  To date, this ‘working relationship’ has yet to be fully defined. 
 The most recent development in which the Province is engaged to support First Nations 
self-government is to continue discussions at the Exploratory Table. It has committed $500,000 
in its latest budget to funding these discussions.  It is at this table that some of the current issues 
not dealt with through the framework on consultation are supposed to be addressed. These 
include the following: environmental stewardship, the opportunity to be involved in the wealth of 
the province, and traditional land use and mapping.312   
Fulfilment of the OTC’s recommendations need not be implemented through the 
establishment of another institutional mechanism, such as a treaty implementation framework 
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agreement.  Time and expense can be saved by tackling the issues enumerated above as part of 
the consultation process.  These issues are already the fundamental stumbling blocks of 
designing a consultation process.  In addition, industry’s timelines for development and the 
motivation of resource development promise to move the process forward in a timely way.  
Lastly, consultation has a built-in source of funding to draw upon to not only fund participation, 
but to aid in fulfilling Crown treaty obligations to First Nations.  
It’s virtually impossible to have discussions about the land and its resources without 
adequate consideration of the wide-ranging impacts of potential decisions on the land.   Although 
speaking in the context of comprehensive claims, negotiators eventually concluded that: “Land 
and the jurisdiction over it are bound up inseparably with the preservation of [A]boriginal 
societies as distinct, self-sufficient, social orders in Canada.  This distinction applies particularly 
to [A]boriginal societies whose economies, religions, political systems, education systems, and 
family relations are established by reference to their traditional lands.”313 A workable 
consultation process for the duty to consult and accommodate cannot be established in the 
current policy environment in Saskatchewan, separate from the consideration of treaties.  On the 
whole, a more comprehensive approach to implementing the treaties has been recommended by 
the Government of Canada.  It recommended “an integrated approach concerning the treaties, 
whereby the treaties are linked with governance, jurisdictional and fiscal negotiations.” 314   They 
call it a forward-looking and integrated approach that will lead to strong governments.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions  
The motto of Saskatchewan is ‘from many peoples, strength.’ Borrowing the language of 
the courts, it is clear that, for the most part, the legal duty to consult has failed to reconcile the 
diversity of Aboriginal and settler societies.   Rather than building better relations and a 
productive environment for decision-making on land and resources, consultation appears to be 
driving the Province and Aboriginal governments further away from a resolution. Saskatchewan 
is just the latest jurisdiction struggling to realize the potential of consultation. At this juncture, it 
is uncertain whether First Nations would accept an invitation to feast with the Province, or if the 
Province would be willing to extend one.  
The intent of this paper has been to show how the concept of treaty federalism is not only 
desirable, but necessary, in order to overcome the differences in rights and interests on 
consultation on lands and resources in Saskatchewan.  Treaty federalism is an attractive reality 
because it does not attempt to subvert or circumscribe differences dating back to the time of 
treaty-making, but instead embraces and builds upon the treaties to forge a stronger and more 
productive state.  
 Chapter two was devoted to explaining the concept of and historical backdrop to treaty 
federalism, and how it differed from other conceptions of the relationship between First Nations 
and the Canadian state.  The main thrust of this examination was to push the notion of treaty 
federalism further towards the mainstream of political theory, by showing how it is already 
moving away from the margins and enjoying greater acceptance based on its historical 
significance and theoretical qualities.  In addition, it provided a conceptual framework by which 
to analyze the remainder of the chapters.  
 The third chapter briefly explored the root of the duty—Canadian case law and section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982—and the implications of the legal principles on the political 
relationship between First Nations and the Crown.  The intent of this chapter was to show how 
this one small thread of a larger Aboriginal rights discourse was pointing to a new relationship 
between Aboriginal people and the Crown.  The argument was made that the principles could be 
interpreted as calling for a treaty federal relationship between Aboriginal people and the Crown.  
As many legal scholars have pointed out, the law is just the starting point for negotiations in the 
political realm, and the law can be a powerful catalyst for change or it can sustain the status quo.  
Duty to consult is one of those rare areas of the law that has great potential to foster change that 
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will result in a stronger federal relationship between First Nations and the Crown.  But the 
political will must be present in order to do so.  
 The fourth chapter examined how treaty federalism is being conceptualized and 
implemented through the articulation of a new Aboriginal-state relationship in British Columbia.   
There are three key lessons to be learned from British Columbia.  First, a relationship founded 
upon the principles of treaty federalism is necessary.  The history of the province indicates that 
other avenues, such as provincial Crown unilateralism and the outright denial of any Aboriginal 
title in the province have already been tried, and have been proven to be untrue or not a viable 
process for the resolution of competing rights and interests between the provincial Crown and 
First Nations.  This conclusion, although not proven in this paper, is an important starting point 
for discussing First Nation – state relations in British Columbia, as it highlights the importance 
of the current new relationship, and so is included as a key lesson.   
 A second lesson from British Columbia is that the vision of a new relationship must be 
better articulated in practice. Agreement must be reached on at least the principles that will 
underpin its implementation, especially what ‘shared decision-making’ will entail.   A third 
lesson is that mechanisms need to be in place to ensure the vision is implemented not only by 
high-level bureaucrats, but also by regional and local administrators.  First and foremost, all 
government employees must have a clear understanding of what implementation of the new 
relationship involves and have concise guidelines on how to implement it in practice.  
Government must walk its talk. In this regard, British Columbia is a case of what not to do, 
because its lack of a clearly defined vision and implementation framework/strategy are 
preventing its proposal for a new relationship from being a reality.  The overarching teaching 
from British Columbia is that the realization of a treaty-federalist relationship may be possible if 
the political will exists on both sides to clarify what it means and then proceed in unity towards 
designing legislation, frameworks and mechanisms for its realization.   
The fifth chapter built upon the promise inherent in the concept of treaty federalism and 
the legal principles, and the BC experience to examine the policy environment in Saskatchewan.  
The obstacles to consultation were explored by analyzing the most recent policy developments in 
the province. The central issue preventing consultation from moving forward is the differing 
interpretation of the treaties.  Valuable analysis on the treaties from the Office of the Treaty 
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Commissioner was provided in order to shed some light on how Saskatchewan can get past its 
current impasse.   
A consultation policy based on a more equitable foundation of treaty federalism can 
overcome the current impasse in consultation, and lead to a better economic and social future for 
First Nations and the province as a whole.  As described in chapter one, the Supreme Court and 
academics from various disciplines, most notably history, law and political science, are engaging 
in a re-interpretation of the treaties.  This interpretation largely is consistent with the ‘First 
Nation Perspective’, and is based on a critical methodological approach to understanding the 
treaties that considers all the available evidence from the time of treaty-making, and is not 
limited to a ‘selective’ reading of the text of the treaties.  Some academics go so far as to suggest 
that the treaties are constitutional accords that bind the Crown and First Nations together in a 
clearly defined, harmonious and unifying relationship. If the current trend or, perhaps, growing 
consensus, in law and academia is to be believed, then Saskatchewan would be well-advised to 
reformulate its consultation policy in a manner that is consistent with the most accurate 
interpretation of the treaties. The position of the provincial Crown on treaties soon may find little 
support in history, law and politics.   
There is little reason why Saskatchewan cannot follow in the footsteps of its British 
Columbia counterpart.  The two jurisdictions share more in common than not, and the 
differences are more in degree than kind.  The policy in British Columbia and Saskatchewan is 
underpinned by the same Aboriginal rights discourse.  Although Aboriginal title may still exist in 
British Columbia, the legal significance of the historical numbered treaties and recent 
pronouncements on the duty to consult doctrine provide similar catalysts for negotiations in 
Saskatchewan.  Crown unilateralism or a lack of meaningful consultation has been shown to lead 
to failure in negotiations and economic dead-ends for the provincial government in British 
Columbia; Saskatchewan need not head down this path.  The current Saskatchewan party is a 
very new government in comparison to the British Columbia government, and this adds to the 
necessity of deferring to a jurisdiction with considerably more experience.  It is clear that both 
provinces are heading in the same direction, it is just a matter of which one will reach its 
destination first.   Filling the present policy vacuum in Saskatchewan is a definite challenge, but 
by taking more time at the outset to formulate a workable process, Saskatchewan has the 
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opportunity to avoid the litigation and uncertainty that has plagued First Nation-provincial 
relations on lands and resources in most other provinces in Canada.   
 A treaty federalism consultation framework must not only identify principles of shared 
decision-making, it must articulate such principles in the form of practical policy mechanisms 
and action.   High-level commitments to mutual cooperation, respect and trust are meaningless if 
they are not being implemented ‘on the ground’ with institutional safeguards.  At the level of 
vision, the relationship must be on a government-to-government basis that recognizes the 
inherent right of Aboriginal self-government consistent with distinctive traditions and practices 
of self-determination; and agrees that the stewardship of the land and its resources should be 
shared by First Nations and the provincial Crown.  Such recognition entails the Province of 
Saskatchewan move past its current position on treaty interpretation to embrace the more 
complete picture of the historical treaties as based on mutual stewardship of the land.  It must 
begin to realize that the treaties can and should be the basis of all political negotiations in the 
province, particularly the most pressing issue of the duty to consult. The parties must negotiate 
goals, a strategic vision, principles, action plans and a management committee and working 
groups to foster implementation of its vision of a new relationship. Some intergovernmental 
mechanisms to foster cooperation on facilitating First Nations governance have already been 
established, and these can be built upon.  British Columbia offers some practical ideas for 
mechanisms of shared decision-making, all of which facilitate intercultural dialogue.  The 
Province of Saskatchewan and First Nations must decide what mechanisms will work best for 
them.  A dispute resolution process involving an independent, third party, perhaps the OTC, is 
absolutely necessary to maintain shared decision-making that truly balances the concerns and 
interests of the parties. 
  
Future Research 
 The duty to consult is a constantly evolving topic in legal jurisprudence.  At present, 
hundreds of duty to consult cases are winding their way through the various court systems across 
Canada.  With each new court decision, the duty to consult is re-articulated, sometimes with 
major implications.  Legal scholars have been doing an admirable job keeping up with the latest 
pronouncements of the courts. However, as I hope I have demonstrated to a small degree, the 
concept of the duty to consult is also very much a political question.  To date, not much attention 
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seems to have been given to the political dimensions and implications of the duty.  For instance, 
what role has duty to consult played in recent political developments in British Columbia?  
Specifically, Aboriginal title has been recognized as a major driver of political change in this 
province, but what has been the significance of the duty to consult here?  This is just an example 
of one jurisdiction, similar questions could be asked in other provinces.  The concept raises many 
noteworthy questions about important linkages between legal jurisprudence and Aboriginal 
governance, and their implications for policy.  Overall, more research needs to be done on the 
political dimensions and implications of the duty to consult. 
 The various mechanisms and options for shared decision-making is an area of research 
that also warrants further study.  In Saskatchewan alone, there are additional examples of where 
the provincial and First Nation governments have managed to share jurisdiction in pursuit of a 
common goal.  The Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Agreement and framework is such an 
example.  Granted, in this case, the province and First Nations appeared to be proceeding 
towards a common goal.  Perhaps further study of that particular case and others like it may shed 
some light on how commonalities can be identified within the duty to consult.  
To reiterate, a marked limitation of this research is that it pertains only to First Nations, 
while the duty to consult is applicable to all Aboriginal peoples. A possible avenue for further 
research may lie in studying how the duty impacts the political position of other Aboriginal 
groups.  In Northern Saskatchewan in particular, the duty to consult and accommodate regarding 
Métis and non-status people may be especially significant, given the sizeable population of such 
residents who have occupied and the used the land for generations.  Their rights and interests 
should not be ignored.  The roles of industry and the federal government in the duty to consult 
process are also areas that warrant further research.  Lastly, government actions in jurisdictions 
beyond lands and resources may be infringing upon Aboriginal and treaty rights, proven and 
unproven, and additional research needs to be conducted in this regard.    
One area that does not require more research is the historical treaties of Saskatchewan. 
Instead, the existing research and publications, most notably those of the Office of the Treaty 
Commissioner, must instead be acted upon so that they inform policy considerations in the 
province of Saskatchewan.  
The implementation of a forward-looking treaty relationship will require much more than the 
establishment of a more accurate and comprehensive historical record.  The people of 
Saskatchewan need to see actions taken to renew the treaty relationship as solemn 
commitments based upon a rededication of the parties to a relationship based upon fair 
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dealing, trust, and respect.  People need to understand the nature of the rights and 
responsibilities of both treaty partners and the enduring nature of these commitments.”315 
 
The process of treaty federalism holds the promise of bringing people together in a strong, 
harmonious and sustainable union.  That which unites us can be stronger than that which divides 
us. However, at this juncture in Saskatchewan’s history, the province’s motto is merely words, 
with no real action behind them, just like the articulation of the new relationship between First 
Nations and the Province. 
 
   
   
 
 
                                                
315 OTC, Treaties as a Bridge, 74. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Comparison of Concepts 
 
Treaty Federalism Principle Duty to Consult Principle* 
The Purpose 
 
The purpose of treaty federalism is to mutually balance 
the autonomy/freedom and interdependence /belonging 
of the parties. (Balances civic dignity with civic 
participation.) 
 
 
The purpose of consultation is to reconcile Aboriginal 
and settler societies. 
The Starting point: The Trigger: 
 
Mutual and equal recognition of nationhood with 
separate spheres of autonomous jurisdiction. 
 
Mutual consent to the process. 
 
Concurrent areas of jurisdiction are set out whereby the 
autonomy of both nations is redefined in relation to the 
other to create an innovative transnational covenant or 
unity. 
 
 
The obligation arises when the Crown has knowledge of 
the potential existence of the Aboriginal interest and is 
contemplating action that may adversely affect it. 
 
Consultation with Aboriginal groups should take place as 
early as possible in the project’s planning stages.  
 
Nature of the concept 
 
Intercultural dialogue or rational thinking, constructive 
dialogue and true exchange of ideas is both the process 
and outcome. 
 
 
The duty is both procedural and substantive in its process 
and outcome.  
The ‘Who’ of the Concepts 
 
The ‘who’ is identified by the signatories to the treaties, 
namely the Crown and First Nations in Canada. 
  
 
The obligation to consult and, where indicated, to 
accommodate Aboriginal interests lies with the Crown 
alone; there is no independent obligation on third parties.  
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 However, the Crown may delegate procedural aspects of 
consultation to industry. 
 
 
Mutual and equal recognition of nationhood with 
separate spheres of autonomous jurisdiction. 
 
Trust in honouring the commitments made.  
 
 
The obligation is owed by both the provincial and federal 
Crown. 
The substance of the obligation 
 
Trust in honouring the commitments made. 
 
Responsive to the popular will rather than dictated by an 
absolute sovereign. 
 
 
The extent of the obligation will be proportionate to: the 
strength of the case supporting an asserted interest (if a 
proven right is not at issue); and the seriousness of the 
potentially adverse effect on the applicable interest. 
 
Consent to the process and outcome. 
 
Mutual consent to the process. 
 
Responsive to the popular will rather than dictated by an 
absolute sovereign. 
 
 
Neither an Aboriginal group asserting an as-yet unproven 
right, nor a First Nation signatory to a historical treaty 
claiming treaty rights, will hold a veto over the uses to 
which Crown land may be put. 
Substance of negotiation 
 
Intercultural dialogue or rational thinking, constructive 
dialogue and true exchange of ideas is both the process 
and outcome. 
 
 
 
 
The Crown has a positive obligation to “pro-actively 
address” any potential infringement concerning land and 
resources.   
This includes the Crown researching both the nature and 
scope of the right at stake as well as the impact of the 
regulated activity in question and to provide the First 
Nation with all the necessary information in a timely way 
so that they have an opportunity to express their interests 
and concerns during the consultation process. 
 
Intercultural dialogue or rational thinking, constructive 
dialogue and true exchange of ideas is both the process 
 
The Aboriginal group in question must also consult in 
good faith and must not frustrate the Crown’s good faith 
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and outcome. efforts to consult.  
 
 
Concurrent areas of jurisdiction are set out whereby the 
autonomy of both nations is redefined in relation to the 
other to create an innovative transnational covenant or 
unity. 
 
Intercultural dialogue or rational thinking, constructive 
dialogue and true exchange of ideas is both the process 
and outcome. 
 
Trust in honouring the commitments made.   
 
 
Good faith consultation reveals a duty to accommodate 
when modifications need to be made to proposed 
government action or policy.  The duty to accommodate 
involves a process of minimizing adverse impacts, 
substantively addressing Aboriginal interests, and in the 
absence of agreement, balancing interests.     
 
 
Intercultural dialogue or rational thinking, constructive 
dialogue and true exchange of ideas is both the process 
and outcome. 
 
Concurrent areas of jurisdiction are set out whereby the 
autonomy of both nations is redefined in relation to the 
other to create an innovative transnational covenant or 
unity. 
 
Trust in honouring the commitments made.  
 
 
Crown obligations to consult, and, where indicated, to 
accommodate Aboriginal interests may be satisfied 
through an effective administration of an applicable 
regulatory process.  However, a determination of whether 
the obligations have been successfully discharged in any 
particular case will involve a subjective analysis, looking 
at the nature of the right, the nature of the infringement, 
and the extent of the consultation undertaken in the 
particular circumstances.  Mere adherence to regulatory 
guidelines will not necessarily suffice.  
Implementing change to the process 
 
Terms of the relationship may only be renewed or 
renegotiated through the same process. 
 
Responsive to the popular will rather than dictated by an 
absolute sovereign.  
 
Mutual consent to the process. 
 
 
Reliance on the courts. 
Where a prior agreement exists 
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Trust in honouring the commitments made.  
 
 
First Nations that are signatories to historical treaties 
hold procedural treaty rights (e.g. the right to be 
honourably consulted), in addition to any specific 
substantive rights (e.g. the right to hunt and trap). 
 
The Crown itself has a historical treaty right (that exists 
in some form in all of the numbered treaties) to “take up” 
surrendered lands for a variety of purposes with the 
effect that certain treaty First Nations will be precluded 
from exercising their rights to hunt, trap or fish on those 
lands.  However, the exercise of this treaty right by the 
Crown must be honourable and must involve a process of 
consultation and, where indicated, accommodation of 
Aboriginal interests that may be adversely impacted. 
 
*Legal Principles 
 
A recent publication authored by three legal practitioners in the field, which succinctly sets out the legal principles316 
of the duty to consult is used as a basis for this summary of the case law.  In addition, a brief description of the 
principles’ source in the case law is provided, with amendments and additions to the principles as determined by 
additional texts by other legal scholars and practitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
316 Treacy, Heather L, Campbell Tara L., and Dickson, Jamie D. “The Current State of the Law in Canada 
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Alberta Law Review, 44, (2006-2007), 593-595. 
